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1. Abstract 
The Spanish transition into democracy and the ratification of the new Spanish constitution 
of 1978 brought a new power structure to the sovereign State of Spain. Regions in Spain, such 
as Andalusia, Basque country, Catalonia, and Navarra, wanted - after the hegemony of 
Francisco Franco - to reinstate their traditions, languages, cultures, and identities. To avoid a 
recurrence of the Spanish civil war of 1936, the Spanish parliament informally constituted the 
State of Autonomies. After 1978, communities in Spain could apply for the autonomous status 
with which they received the right to self-govern. However, this meant that the communities 
had to hold regional elections, and that the elected parties on the regional level had to implement 
policies to regulate their region’s economy, and social situation. 
Around the initiation of the Autonomous State, there were already economic disparities 
visible between regions, disparities that grew bigger over time. This resulted that, prior to the 
debt crisis of 2008, the distribution of economic wealth and the standard of living was fiercely 
disproportioned amidst the regions. Although, the autonomous status did play a key role, it did 
not explained exactly how the disparities came to be. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation 
became to discover the main explanatory variable on how one region became economically 
more developed than the other.  
Previous empirical data indicated that economic development was a combination of 
economic growth, gross regional product per capita, government expenditure on education & 
healthcare, and unemployment rate. Each dimension is linked with each other and is directly 
influenced by policies that are implemented by political parties. Therefore, the research would 
focus on discovering the ideologies behind political parties, the motives behind their policies, 
and their economic consequences, by tracing the process from 1978 until 2008 among five 
regions. The cases: Andalusia, Valencia, Madrid, Castilla and León, and Castilla-La Mancha 
were analysed in four periods in which the cases were vulnerable for change. Afterwards, a 
cross-case comparison was made to better identify similarities and differences, and monitor the 
consequences of the cases’ policies. 
The research revealed that political parties that were simultaneous active on the central and 
regional level of government, did not follow the same policies. Although, the parties on a 
regional level did not alter their ideology, they did prefer regional circumstances above of those 
on the central level. Furthermore, the parties constituted and implemented policies that were 
aligned with their ideology, but were mainly based on the regional economy and social status 
instead of the national over-all situation. Moreover, the identity of the region was mainly 
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discarded by the political parties, albeit not enough empirical data could be found to support 
the idea that identity was an important part in the policy-making process. 
It was concluded that regions that elected political parties, whom maintained an economic 
perspective while fighting economic setbacks, implemented policies that decreased the 
unemployment rate, and provided more economic growth and wealth, were the most 
economically developed. With the increase of economic wealth, the political parties distributed 
more resources towards the region’s education and healthcare system, what improved the 
standard of living accordingly. This resulted that Valencia, and Castilla and León, were more 
economic developed than Andalusia and Castilla-La Mancha, whereas Madrid was crowned as 
the most economic developed autonomous community. 
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2. Introduction 
“Ladies and gentlemen, 
Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate: 
As an expression to the historic moments in which we live, I have sanctioned, 
as the King of Spain, the Constitution approved by Parliament and ratified by 
the Spanish people. I want that my short and simple words will be those of 
gratitude towards the members and groups who have laid the fundamental 
norm with which we can democratically coexist.” 
- King Juan Carlos I of Spain, 1978 
 
With these words, the King of Spain; Juan Carlos I enabled his country to make the transition 
into democracy. After three turbulent - but peaceful - years, the new Spanish Senate constructed 
a new constitution that would replace the constitution of 1878; disregarding the fundamental 
laws during the hegemony of Francisco Franco 1939-1975, and the Republic constitution of 
1931-1939. The latter was, although not officially recognized, still fresh in the minds of the 
Spanish Senate, while constructing the new constitution. Although the constitution of 1933 was 
not a direct causation of the Spanish civil war, it was nonetheless a contributor to the increasing 
tensions between Republicans and Nationalists, advocates of decentralization versus 
centralization, and ethno-territorial identities versus national identities at that time. 
In order to prevent a recurrence of confrontational conflicts - or worse, a new civil war - the 
Spanish Senate intended to incorporate constitutional compromises to maintain Spain as one 
united State (Colomer, 1998: 41). After the death of President Francisco Franco and the fall of 
Francoist Spain in 1975, four Spanish communities demanded independence; Catalonia, 
Navarra, Basque country, and Andalusia (Conversi, 2000). These four communities were struck 
down the hardest during the hegemony of Franco that oppressed any endogenous influences 
differentiating from the ‘pure’ Spanish culture, language and traditions. To satisfy the demands 
of the communities, the Spanish Senate implemented in article 2, the right to autonomy, stating: 
“[...] it recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of 
which it is composed, and the solidarity amongst them all (Span. const. 1978, art. II).” Although 
not written in constitutional text, the foundation of the ‘State of Autonomies’ was laid. 
Nevertheless, Spain was dealing with a difficult puzzle of correctly restoring its monarchy, 
stabilizing its economy, and harmonizing all its nationalities (Moreno, 2002: 399). The four 
aforementioned communities indeed had the most strongest feeling towards their own 
‘nationality’, however they were not the only communities that tended to do so; Valencia, 
Galicia, and Aragon, for example, indicated that they more felt having a dual-identity rather 
than one regional or national identity (Moreno, 2001: 402). Furthermore the regions; Castilla-
La Mancha, Valencia, and Andalusia, were economically the lesser regions, and felt it was due 
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to the policies that the central government beleaguered upon them. Therefore, reinforcing the 
sentiment to receive the autonomous status.   
To accelerate the process of decentralization, all parties made constitutional compromises 
by creating territorial governments whose authority extended to the borders of their assigned 
regions (Colomer, 1998: 40). 
Also what increased the pressure towards the central government, was the lack of institutions 
specialized in regional cooperation; this lead to the competition and bargaining between 
regional governments and political governments, in order to get a head start over the central 
government (Ibid, 1998: 44). 
The strategies worked, and the informal agreement of El Estatuto de Autonomías (the State 
of Autonomies) - based on the second article of the constitution - was realized in 1979, thus 
creating 17 autonomous communities and 2 autonomous cities. Now, almost 40 years ex post 
facto Spain remains as one decentralized State, even though it underwent an enormous 
transformation. The contemporary communities differ significantly among each other – 
economically and socially – arguably because they are ensuing their own regional policies. 
Therefore, this thesis will focus more on the development of the economic and social situation 
amidst the autonomous communities of Spain until prior to the economic crises.  
The repercussions of the 2008 debt crisis is not the sole perpetrator of why the communities 
economically differ today. Up until the crisis, the communities already showed significant 
economic disparities, what can be reinforced by looking at the Spanish Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) divided per region of 2008. If taken Spain’s GDP as 100% then Andalusia contributes 
around 13% of the domestic GDP, whereas the Basque Country only contributes 6% (Eurostat, 
2008). However, when looking at the unemployment rate of the dyad, Andalusia scores around 
26%, while the Basque country’s rate is just under the 3% (Eurostat, 2008). 
The fact that there are differences among the communities is almost self-evident, since the 
term autonomy can be considered as a synonym for the right to self-govern. Although, the right 
to self-govern might answer the question on why policies differ per region, it is not 
automatically the reason on how the communities changed. For example, Dimaggio and Powell 
(1983) argued that institutions that are active in the same branch and are confronted with similar 
conflicts or hostile atmospheres, tend to isomorph into institutions that show homogenous rules 
and/or policies. This could mean that communities that have political parties with the similar 
ideology might develop matching features. 
Luis Moreno (2001) however is convinced that the differences among communities is due 
to the high amount of dual-identities that are clearly presence within the regions. Thus stating 
Mi Comunidad es su Comunidad   7 | P a g e  
 
that communities will not develop similarities, since the communities have a strong affection 
towards their own regional traditions, ethics, beliefs and ideas. Enric Martinez-Herrera (2002) 
partial agrees with Moreno, but argues that political and economic arrangements are directly 
and negatively affected when there is no strong sense of national solidarity (Ibid, 2002: 426).  
Therefore, this dissertation aims, by cross-comparing the Spanish Autonomous 
Communities, to answer the question; how economic development amidst the Spanish 
communities differentiated so significantly since the Spanish transition into democracy in 1978 
until the start of the economic crisis of 2008. 
2.1 Societal and Theoretical relevance 
Anno 2017, the after-effects of the great recession of 2008 are still being felt in Spain in 
every level of society; micro, meso, and macro. Spain is still licking its wounds, while it tries 
to figure out where it went wrong and how to decrease the economic disparities among the 
regions. Ignoring the influences of the European Union and the European Monetary Union, and 
under the motto scientia potentia est, Spain should take a critical look at its own ‘federal’ 
decentralized system. 
Furthermore, the political trust of the Spanish citizens has declined significantly during the 
crisis (Torcal, 2014), which is not surprising. In a framework of eight years – 2008 until 2016 
– there were four elections, whereas there were several cases of corruption revealed among 
political parties (Ibid, 2014: 1559). Also, there was an increase in distrust and tension among 
communities, since richer communities had to aid for their poorer neighbours (Garcia-Milà & 
McGuire, 2014). Therefore, by investigating if identity and cultures were not the main reason 
to why communities differentiate, and that it may have other causes such as economic or 
institutional, it might decrease tensions and advocate cooperation amidst communities.   
By taking a closer look at the economic policies maintained by each community, while 
taking culture and identity as a confounding variable, a better overview can be provided to 
pinpoint changes and disparities, and how these came to be. 
The theoretical aspects of the thesis is that a myriad of scholars argue that the Spanish 
communities differ only due to cultural aspects and identities, such as; Moreno (2002); Bollen 
and Medrano (1998); and Colomer (1998). Albeit the statement that identities emit a certain 
influence in the decision-making process might carry some truth, this thesis also argues that 
economic and political features played an important role, since rational changes in policies 
might have been implemented as a reaction to economic circumstances. 
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Through process-tracing the autonomous communities from the Spanish transition in 1978 
until the start of the economic crisis of 2008, this report hopes to concatenate a tight sequences 
of events (Toshkov, 2016: 298) in order to provide extra validity to the thesis’ findings. Lastly, 
the results that shall be generated by this research, could hopefully assist the ongoing works of 
the aforementioned scholars or future researches of other highly motivated scholars and 
students. 
2.2 Limitations of the Thesis 
Unfortunately, this thesis is confronted by several severe limitations. The largest limitation 
is the limited timeframe in which this thesis was written. Consequently, extra validity that could 
be gained through surveys or interviews could not reach data saturation in time. Therefore, to 
increase the validity of the findings, this thesis redirects its attention to primary sources such as 
governmental documents on the supra-, inter-, and national level. Regrettably, the archival 
research necessary for the obtainment of the documents has also been affected by the limited 
timeframe. Nevertheless, to avoid selection bias and increase validity, the documents and data 
used in this dissertation originate from institutions, interest groups and political parties, whom 
carry different ideologies, preferences and beliefs. 
Second limitation lies within the concept of small-N analysis that tends to produce lesser 
measurement validity than large-N analysis. Due to the fact that small-N analyses have a limited 
numbers of cases to analyse, it cannot trust that the cases are sufficient to reduce measurement 
errors (Toshkov, 2016: 259). Hence again, validity becomes an issue that must be taken into 
consideration with the designing of the research. Furthermore, Small-N analyses are inadequate 
when the causal mechanisms are weak and heterogeneous (Ibid 2016: 259), therefore the case 
selection was to a certain extent randomized, while being chosen on semi-homogeneous as well 
as semi-heterogeneous causal relationships. 
Last limitation consists of the fact that this thesis will deal with hard and soft data, meaning 
that the conclusion at the end might be open for interpretation. Although in political science 
nothing can be conclude but merely assumed, this thesis will try to back-up the soft data by 
combining it with hard data, if possible, to give a concrete coherent conclusion. 
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2.3 Thesis structure 
To provide this Master dissertation with a deductive structure, the thesis will start with the 
theoretical framework in chapter 3. In this chapter, the empirical theories on which this thesis’ 
theory is based upon, will be elaborated further in more details. The theory is a combination of 
the basic economic principles, ethno-territorial-, dual- and national-identities, political 
preferences, and some features of historical institutionalism. The subsequent chapter 4 will 
contain the academic literature that stands at the base of the thesis’ hypotheses and causal 
mechanisms. 
The literature in this chapter will be reviewed and, if deemed necessary, scrutinized. The 
next chapter, chapter 5, contains the research design of this dissertation. In this chapter, the 
most preeminent terms will be conceptualized, whereas they subsequently will be 
operationalized to be available for the research. This chapter’s purpose is to ensure that the 
research is replicable and can be used for further studies.  
Chapter 6 will contain the data analysis. The analysis is constructed to guide the reader 
through the history of Spain from the transition into democracy until the initiation of the debt 
crisis of 2008. It will start by grasping the initial conditions according to historical 
institutionalism, whereas the timeline will be dissected into four periods. Each period will 
commence with an introduction containing the essential and relevant events that occurred in 
that period of time. Furthermore, the chapter will research five cases in each time period, 
whereas each period will end with a cross-case comparison. The main focus of this chapter and 
therefore the purpose of the dissertation is the comparison amidst cases to answer the research 
question. 
The following chapter will collect the results and discuss them in order to see if the data has 
proven or disproven the hypotheses of chapter 4. Lastly, the thesis will end by gathering all the 
findings to provide a concrete conclusion that will answer the research question. 
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3. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
The King’s speech of 1978 with which he ratified his signing of the new constitution of 
Spain, initiated the process of the power decentralization of Spain. From this day on, the 
Spanish communities could apply for the autonomous status, thus granting them the right to 
self-govern while it being accepted and guaranteed by the central government.  
Although this thesis takes into account the importance of history, the concept itself is 
insufficient to explain why the autonomous communities differentiate economically. Therefore, 
the concept of historical institutionalism will not be leading, but will carry just a partial role in 
this thesis’ theoretical framework. Furthermore, since there is not an abundant amount of 
theories available on which the thesis can fall back on, other dimensions, such as; economic 
development, identity, and political influences, are merged together and elaborated in this 
chapter to create a unique theory for the research of this dissertation. 
3.1 History and Critical Junctures 
The ratification of the Spanish Constitution is a moment that fuels functionalists among the 
political scholars in present society, since it is this moment in time that indicates that history 
affects the future. After all, communities can now implement policies to influence its financial 
and economic situation. It is one of the sequences that Mahoney recognizes in the theory of 
historical institutionalism that directly affects the contemporary status of institutions (2006: 
457). 
With process-tracing, history normally plays a big role, since it often reveals causal 
mechanisms that might have affected the future or still do. In multifarious fields, scholars 
advocate the fact that history plays a major role – for example in economics or politics – and 
that each institution is involved in a process where the consequences of its previous-made 
decisions have created a path that the institution must follow (Pierson, 2000: 492); this concept 
is called ‘path dependence’.  
According to the majority of functionalists, it is not possible to get off the path, however 
there is a dispute among scholars on how a path might be affected. Some scholars such as; 
Somers (1996), and Kisher and Hechter (1991) argue that the path institutions follow are 
determined by the initial conditions and cannot be changed later on in time. Whereas scholars 
such as; Pierson (2000), Mahoney (2006), and Goldberg (1998) do not dismiss the idea of initial 
conditions; as matter of fact they do believe that they are essential to set out the primary 
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trajectory, yet believe that along the path events will occur that enable a path’s direction to 
change. These periods are labelled critical junctures (Cappocia & Keleman, 2007: 348).   
Referring back to the initial conditions, they are directly connected with the further 
outcomes; it is this causal effect that is the main concern in this dimension. Decisions, means, 
traditions, ideas, identity, beliefs and every other possible attribute, at the beginning of a path, 
will determine the trajectory that the institution shall follow.  
This thesis, however, will not follow the path of each case, but will recognize that initial 
conditions are indeed essential for further developments within institutions, organizations, and 
States. Therefore, it will look at how influential economic circumstances, identity and political 
policies were at the beginning, and how their consequences evolved over time.  
Furthermore, the concept of critical junctures will also be adopted in this dissertation to 
indicate periods of change and to state that initial conditions are not absolute. Therefore, the 
dissertation is constructed to follow the autonomous communities from the period where they 
received their autonomous status until the debt crisis of 2008.     
3.2 Economic Development 
In several dissertations, such as Moreno (2001) or Martinez-Herrera (2002), the economic 
situation of the Spanish regions are displayed in figures of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
to display economic disparities among communities. Although, the GDP can be considered as 
an adequate tool to measure economic wealth, it however does lack the power to provide a 
correct picture of the economic developments of a region, thus failing to indicate differentiation 
amidst communities. 
Economists have always be reluctant to completely trust GDP, since a majority of 
economists perceive the GDP as a specialized tool. Although, governments and institutions 
have incorporated the GDP as the main tool to display economic growth, economists know that 
the indicators often have severe limitations which directly affects the trustworthiness of the tool 
(Costanza; Hart; Talberth & Posner, 2009: 11). Of course, economists will not leave the flaws 
of GDP at rest and, thus there have been intentions to ‘correct’ GDP accordingly. 
Nevertheless, all measurements remained with the same limitations; first limitation is the 
low level of unanimity of how to value objects that are not regularly reported in monetary terms, 
such as corruption or illegal activities (Ibid, 2009: 11). Second limitation is the idea that 
institutions or governments are biased. This means that at the moment of measuring the 
expenses, there will be looked at which ones are beneficiary - thus added to the total - and which 
are pernicious and should be removed (Ibid, 2009: 12). Last limitation is the low degree of 
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unanimity on how to ‘correctly’ value and implement depleting natural sources (Ibid, 2009: 
12). Despite the limitations of GDP, it should not automatically be dismissed due to some flaws 
rather improved by other measurements, neither should it be equated to economic development. 
To recognize economic development, it is essential to look at a wider range of statistics. 
Development must broaden its focus to measure on how individuals are affected by economic 
changes, and how their living standards have increased. Therefore, more variables must be 
added to the equation, to correctly measure development. GDP will be used as one of the 
measurements, while denying it the honour of being the main feature. Other measurements, 
when combined, will show economic development, these measurements are inspired on the 
theory of Lancaster (1984) that divided economic development in three sectors; Economic 
Security, Social Freedom, and Consumption Capacity. The three dimension can be directly 
influenced by political parties and governmental institutions by the creation and the 
implementation of economic and social policies.  
The former of the three dimension will be measured by the unemployment rate; the greater 
the unemployment rate, the lesser the standard of life. Although, unemployment must not be 
equated with poverty, it is however an effective measurement to indicate the financial situation 
of a province, region, or State (Lancaster, 1984).  
The middle indicates social freedom and can also be interpreted as social equality, these can 
be measured through the accessibility of citizens for education or health care. However, it can 
be measured two-ways, first measurement is through an analysis to determine how many 
students and citizens are using the education system and health-care system. This has yet a 
downside; for example, the amount of students does not always correlate with the accessibility 
of education, personal characteristics and cultures may play a significant role as well – e.g. not 
wanting to study. The second approach is to measure how much a government spends on 
education and healthcare to expand or improve the quality of its systems. Although this measure 
neither displays the level of accessibility of education and healthcare, it could be a good 
indicator for the standards, thus preferred for this dissertation (Ibid, 1984). 
Lastly is consumption capacity, which looks at the GDP per capita. The average GDP per 
citizens, is a good indicator to see the average economic wealth of the citizens and the amount 
of spending power. However, it remains an average figure and, of course, differs per inhabitant. 
Especially the unemployed will be underneath this average number (Ibid, 1984). 
Nevertheless, combining these three dimension and sub-dimensions should be sufficient, 
together with the GDP to indicate the level of economic development of autonomous entity. It 
is tempting to accept ceteris paribus, by stating that if GDP grows that the economic 
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development will grow as well. Unfortunately this is not always the case, which is one of the 
main motivations behind this thesis, arguing that due to other factors certain policies are 
adopted that caused the differences between communities. 
3.3 Dual-identities in Spain 
The decentralization of Spain has led to 17 autonomous communities and 2 autonomous 
cities. Furthermore, the central government recognized that communities could self-govern and 
recognized their ‘nationalities’. It is this recognition that was chosen to lessen the friction 
between communities, while at the same time thickening the borders. 
The fact that Spain became a nation of nations, resulted that the Spaniards did not feel per 
se Spaniards. Officially they carry the Spanish nationality, however identity is closely related 
to sentiment; that is to say that individuals often recognize themselves to a group by feelings 
rather than status (Epstein, 1978). Therefore, this thesis makes a difference between national 
identities and ethno-territorial identities. 
Ethno-territorial identity comes into existence through the intertwining dimensions of: 
cultural, social, and psychological, which make it possible for groups to emphasize to various 
degrees: origins, cultural aspects, common solidarity and unity (Moreno & Arriba, 1996: 79). 
Therefore, emotions are deeply imbedded within the concept of ethnic identity, and group 
formations. 
However, it can be argued that a national identity might carry the same characteristics which 
are mentioned before, and there are indeed cases that prove that that argument might be 
plausible. For example, Venezuela is one of the countries where its inhabitants do not identify 
themselves by religion, regions, nor cardinal directions, rather they identify themselves on their 
nationality (Smith, 2006). To make a distinction between national and ethno-territorial identity, 
this thesis will consider national identity as a strong sense to a political community (Smith, 
1991: 9). That is to say, to feel a strong connection towards common institutions and a single 
code for all members of the community (Ibid, 1991: 9). 
It is the combination of decentralizing State-building and autonomous political integration 
that put Spaniards in a crisis of self-identification. If in this crisis, the regional identity is 
stronger than the national identity, the higher the demands of political autonomy become 
(Moreno, 2002: 400) and higher the chances that communities implement policies in order to 
differentiate from other communities. 
Furthermore, the identity of the Spaniards is, according to Moreno (2002) and Martínez-
Herrera (2002), vital for the status of the autonomous communities, but also for the results of 
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the regional elections that will decide on future policies. They argue that the stronger the 
regional identity is, the more it is likely that a regional political party will be chosen, thus 
policies would be implemented more in favour of the regional needs and demands. 
Therefore, the dual identity of the Spaniards is crucial to be taken into the research, since in 
contemporary Spain, it is one of the main explanatory variables on why there is so much 
political conflict and differentiation. 
The theoretical framework indicates that economic development relies on social and 
economic policies introduced by political parties, thus claiming that political parties have a 
direct influence on the region’s financial and economic situation. However, the discussion 
remains whether the parties who implemented the policies reacted to economic circumstances 
or represented the regional identity. By adding all the different degrees of economic 
developments, regional-, dual- or national-identity, political changes, and policies, the 
framework is strengthen and enabled to provide a solid basis from which cross-case comparison 
can be drawn upon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mi Comunidad es su Comunidad   15 | P a g e  
 
4. Literature review 
Political scientists, specialized in Spain or not, have always looked curious at the 
development of the country. After its transition into democracy, the State developed a unique 
‘federal’ structure, yet failing to become a federal State. It is one of the most unique State 
structures in the world, and the only one within Europe. Therefore, scholars in different fields 
monitor Spain to see how a decentralized State may function and develop within the European 
Union. Some scholars - e.g. Davidson (1997); and Stegarescu (2009) - even use Spain as a 
denominator to advocate or dispute decentralization in other countries or with certain policies 
of the European Union. 
Spain became, after the decentralization of State power, a nation of nations, and accepted 
other nationalities to self-govern, following their own culture and traditions, and implement 
their own regional laws, within its central borders. The autonomisation of regions revealed 
ethno-territorial identities submerging that were oppressed during the hegemony of Franco, an 
administration that enforced the Spanish nationality on its inhabitants. It is the roots of ethno-
territorial identities combined with the Spanish nationality that led to the birth of dual-identities 
which were on the foreground of the autonomisation of the Spanish communities. Multiple 
researches are conducted to measure the influences of dual identities on multi-level governance 
and monitor the results. 
This literature review will combine academic literature published on the main explanatory 
independent variables of dual-identities, the GDP dimensions, and the linkage with political 
parties. The research in this report will combine the dual-identities as a potential main 
explanatory variable together with the GDP dimensions mentioned earlier in the theoretical 
framework. These variables emerged through academic publications giving more insight in the 
ongoing discussion of this thesis’ topic. Therefore will the variables; “the influences of dual-
identities on regional behaviour”, “calculating economic development among autonomous 
communities”, will be reviewed to better specify the causal mechanisms and the thesis’ 
hypotheses at the end of this chapter.   
4.1 Influences of dual-identities on regional behaviour 
The economic situation of contemporary Spain is highly affected by the constitutional 
reforms made in the period 1975-1978. However during the constitutional negotiations, 
remarkable little discourse took place regarding economic issues. Rather the majority of the 
time existed out negotiations regarding symbolic issues of nations and nationalities, and 
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historical rights (Keating & Wilson, 2009). This is a result of a long existing crisis within 
Spanish history: a self-identification crisis among the Spanish citizens. Moreno (2001) argues 
that the citizens – depending in which regions they live – have an inner conflict to identify 
themselves between ethno-territorial ascriptive identity and the national State identity (Moreno, 
2001: 400). Moreno argues that the constitution of 1978 has strengthen this crisis since it 
allowed regions to be autonomous and to self-govern, therefore able to implement their own 
culture, tradition and language. Albeit the constitution of 1978 is indeed an important initial 
condition for contemporary Spain, it is however doubtful if it had a contributing role to the 
cultural disintegration among regions; Catalonia, Navarra, Basque country, and Andalusia 
already showed signs of cultural differentiation at the end of the nineteenth century (Keating et 
al, 2009: 537). 
Still, a relationship between dual-identities and the decentralized construction of Spain is 
indeed visible, since a decentralized State cannot exist if one of the two aforementioned 
identities is not present. Moreno argues that if inhabitants all have a national State identity that 
Spain could better function with a centralized government, whereas if each region would only 
identify with their own identity then the demand for independency would skyrocket (2001: 
400). To identify how strong the dual-identity is in Spain, Moreno, conducted a widespread 
survey among citizens within all autonomous communities, by giving citizens the following 
options to choose; Only (region), more (region) than Spanish, As (region) as Spanish, More 
Spanish than (region), Only Spanish, and do not know; which justified his hypothesis that the 
concept of dual-identity is present within Spain. 
These variables were previously used by Bollen & Medrano (1998) who tried to measure the 
level of nationalism and regionalism in Spain and connect those results with economic 
developments and disparities of Spanish regions. The main reason behind the economic 
disparities and the different level of economic development among States is still debated. Bollen 
et al strongly believe that identities have a strong and direct effect on the economic development 
of the region in question. By using two theories; the modernization theory of Parson & Smelser 
(1956), and the theory of internal colonialism of Hechter (1975), they hoped to prove their 
hypothesis. With the usage of the former theory; it is predicted that structural differentiation 
and the diffusion of the universalistic principle would eliminate the regional disparities and 
increase regional development (Bollen et al, 1998: 592). The latter theory however emphasizes 
regional identities will always be withheld by a dominant identities - in this case, the national 
identity - which will actively reproduce regional underdevelopment (Ibid, 1998: 592). 
Nevertheless, Bollen et al concludes that the data most consistently supports the argument that 
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regional development does not play a role on the identity of citizens, whereas the data cannot 
support any arguments for the reverse relationship. A vicious circle might be present; the greater 
economic disparities are within a region, the greater the chances are that there will be less 
collectively sentiment, which could lead to a stronger attachment to regional identity, which 
will lead to greater economic disparities, and the circle is complete. 
Moreno, and Keating et al both agree with the previous statement, adding that the debate of 
financial allocations and the distribution of natural resources among communities have 
enhanced the support of the regional identity. However, this support is not expressed in certain 
retaliation towards the central government, but in the results of the regional elections. With the 
first regional election, 7 communities of 17 chose for a non-nationalist party (Colomer, 1998: 
46), thus indicating that identities might affect economic development indirectly through their 
election behaviour.   
4.2 Calculating economic development among autonomous communities 
Like every other State, Spain is always concerned with its economy, maybe a bit more than 
average due to its complex decentralized structure which enables regions to self-govern. To 
measure the economic wealth and development, many researches look at several economical 
dimensions. Nevertheless, there are still differences of opinion on which dimension display 
economic development most clearly. 
The foundation of the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (FBBVA) is one of the market 
leaders when it comes to conducting regional or national economic researches. 
In 2008, the FBBVA conducted a research to identify the sources of the economic growth 
among regions, thus trying to link it with economic development. The report discarded to use 
Gross Domestic Product to measure economic wealth, since GDP is a sum that includes the 
Gross Value Added (GVA) – or Gross Regional Product (GRP) – plus the taxes on products 
minus the subsidies on products. The preference for using GVA was due to the fact that the 
Basque country and the central government of Spain re-established the concierto economico 
(Ruiz Almendral, 2002), an agreement with adjusted fiscal and economic policies. The central 
government made similar fiscal agreements with Catalonia, therefore GDP would not suffice 
to provide a correct image. Moreover, to improve insights on economic development, the report 
included the dimensions of labour; and employment rate. 
In a time period of 22 years (1985-2007), there were significant indicators of disparities 
amidst regions based on the productivity or TPF (total productivity of all factors). TPF looks at 
the improvements in the quality and availability of productivity factors that are based on effort 
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- which is accumulated by physical and human capital (Ibid, 2008: 1), e.g. industrial, services, 
agriculture. 
The report failed to identify any possible features that might have affected economic 
developments. The results included the facts that among all communities, the contribution of 
human and physical capital were positive, and there was economic growth. Unfortunately, the 
economic growth was due to the catching-up race with the European Union, meaning it was a 
result of maintaining a high rate of capital accumulation and the effort to create employment 
(FBBVA, 2008: 15). The report concludes that the difference of economic growth between 
communities is the main explanatory variables, whereas it also emphasizes that some regions 
have an overly attachment on product specialization of low added value, such as tourism, and 
personal services. 
Adjusting the scope to one region, it should contribute to the previous statement that 
economic growth is indeed essential for the differentiation among communities. Andalusia is 
one of the poorest regions in Spain. However, when looking at the economic growth of 
Andalusia in the ‘80s, with a percentage of 4.92, it outdid the Spanish overall growth rate of 
4.32% (Lizárraga & Chica-Olmo, 2014: 204). Taking into account the dimensions used in the 
report of the FBBVA, Andalusia labour rate was majorly existing out of what the FBBVA 
reckons as low-added-value product specialization; more than 60% of the Andalusians were 
work active in the service industry (Ibid, 2014: 211). Nevertheless, solely using the two 
dimensions is insufficient to determine the economic development of a region neither identify 
the main explanatory variable. Lizárraga et al (2014) admits that economic growth is a factor 
of economic development, but not the main factor. They identify that there are three structural 
breaks in the history of Andalusia that significantly affected the economic growth and 
development. First break coincide with the outbreak of the civil war in 1936, where the 
economy went into a freefall due to limited trading possibilities with other regions of Spain 
(Ibid, 2014: 203). Second break occurred after the Spanish transition, where a new regional 
government was selected. The first regional selection resulted that the Spanish Socialist 
Workers Party (Partido Socialist Obrero Español; PSOE) took seat in the Andalusian 
Parliament. After the 1975 energy crisis, unemployment rates were high, and the new 
Parliament initiated a new economic plan, abandoning the traditional agriculture-specialized 
strategy while opting for product diversification (Ibid, 2014: 205). Last break initiated after the 
Spanish accession to the European Union, which significantly changed the funding it received 
of the central government (Ibid, 2014: 207). Two new dimensions were mentioned to recognize 
economic development; unemployment rate, and political influences.  
Mi Comunidad es su Comunidad   19 | P a g e  
 
Delgado (2001) recognized the latter and during his study of the community of Madrid, 
established that Madrid is the economical capital of Spain due to its political capability. 
Although the PSOE was also the representative of the Madrilenian Parliament for two 
consecutive terms, it did however focused on other dimensions than Andalusia . The focus of 
the PSOE on other aspects aided to the increasing economic development of Madrid (Torcal & 
Montero, 1990), however Delgado argued that Madrid thanked its economic power by two new 
features. First, the geographical position of Madrid in the centre of the country provided them 
with the centre position, which makes it ideal for trade and improved infrastructure (Delgado, 
2001: 361). Moreover due to the climate, it is also suited for agriculture and more attractive for 
industry to locate to, since chances of drought or flood are low. Although the idea is plausible, 
it should also mean that Castilla y León or Castilla La Mancha – which are also situated in the 
centre of the country – to be more economically developed. However, the dyad are slightly 
under national level of GDP (Castro, 2006: 7). Lastly, the high level of infrastructure should 
make Madrid more dominant compared to other communities (Delgado, 2001: 363). Again, the 
idea sounds plausible, however after the accession into the EU, communities received extra 
funding to improve their infrastructure; Andalusia, especially, invested in its infrastructure, to 
better facilitated the tourism flow, nonetheless it is still considered one of the poorest regions. 
Albeit the features mentioned by Delgado should not per se be dismissed, it alone are 
insufficient to indicate disparities among communities. A combination however should be able 
to create an accurate image to pinpoint possible sources on how communities economically 
differentiate. 
4.3 Causal mechanisms and Hypotheses 
In the literature review and the theoretical framework, this thesis already touched multiple 
times upon several causal mechanisms which will be used to generate hypotheses to answer the 
research question of this dissertation.  
The theoretical framework indicated that the economic development could be measured 
through a combination of economic growth, unemployment rate, the expenditure on healthcare 
and education, and lastly, the GRP per capita. These dimensions all have a direct link to 
economic development; meaning that if one dimension might be significant less than the others, 
it will nonetheless directly affect the economic status of the region. Furthermore, the theory 
revealed that the dimensions heavily depend on the social and economic policies that are 
constituted and implemented by the political parties that are active on a regional level.  
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However, it is until here that scholars agree, and where the dispute starts. Due to the fact that 
the regions differentiate on economic development, it initiate the argument that different 
policies have been used per region. Furthermore, empirical data strengthen that argument by 
stating the same political parties, whom were simultaneously elected in different regions – e.g. 
the PSOE in Andalusia and Madrid between 1982 and 1990 – maintained different policies, 
which also seemed to differ from the policies of the party on the central level. Two dimensions 
submerged to have the most potential to influence the policy decision-making process of the 
political parties; reactive behaviour on economic circumstances, and pressure by regional 
identity. 
By analysing the motivational forces of the implemented policies, it becomes possible to 
gather data that will suffice to generate a satisfying answer for the research question of this 
dissertation. Therefore, this thesis dissects the main question into two sub-questions; how did 
these differences in policies among the same political parties came to be, and how did they 
contributed to the differentiation in the economic development among regions? Thus, to better 
steer the research, two general hypotheses were created. 
The first general hypothesis is of economic decent, which argues that the reaction on 
economic circumstances is the most influential factor in the decision-making process to 
implement policies to improve regional economic developments. However, a reaction may 
trigger different responses, therefore the first general hypothesis is preceded by two specific 
hypotheses that represent a different response. The first specific hypothesis focus on a rational 
and functional response to economic setbacks: 
 
Specific hypothesis 1: 
“Confronted with economic setbacks, regional political parties take a functional approach and 
adopt the most effective and efficient policies that have proven to work in the past.” 
 
The second specific hypothesis remains in the surrounding of the political party and its 
ideology. Although some policies are indeed proven more effective to fight certain types of 
economic setbacks – e.g. against high inflation or high unemployment rate – they might affect 
a party’s reputation or endanger the goal a political party might want to achieve. Therefore, the 
second hypothesis is as follow: 
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Specific hypothesis 2: 
“In the event of economic insecurities, political parties will adopt and maintain policies that 
are not per se the most effective but remain aligned with the party’s ideology.”    
 
Although the two hypotheses slightly contradict one another, it will not have a negative 
effect on answering the general hypothesis. As a matter of fact, by confirming one of the two 
specific hypotheses, it will sincerely raises the probability of the first general hypothesis to be 
true. 
 
General hypothesis 1: 
“Regional political parties that are challenged by economic development disparities in their 
region will maintain an economic perspective and adopt policies based on the region’s 
economy.” 
 
Beside an economic approach, the theoretical framework also indicated that in Spain, the 
concept of dual-identities is an important explanatory variable to indicate differences. It is the 
presence of dual-identities after all, that is the driving force by which the autonomous State can 
continue. Therefore, the continuation of the regions is vital to not change the status quo, thus 
the second general hypothesis advocates the importance of identity when political parties decide 
on policies: 
 
General hypothesis 2:  
“Political parties active on a regional level adjust their ideology on the identity of the region, 
therefore adopting policies more focused on the region’s best interest and economic 
development disregarding central interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 | P a g e  P.A. Master Thesis - Richard Venhof 
 
5. Research Design 
The research is designed according to a qualitative research with a small number of units of 
analysis. To discover explanatory variables, this thesis will conduct its research through intense 
archival research. Here it will study documents such as; the economic plans of the Junta or 
Gobierno (regional governments), supranational and domestic statistics, governmental 
institutions’ publications, and academic literature, to identify plausible causal factors on why 
the Spanish autonomous communities differentiate regarding economic development. 
The research will be characterized by an empirical, explanatory and positive nature with the 
mere purpose of answering the research question. In order to come to this answer, the research 
will use a combination of exploratory research and process-tracing to identify the moment in 
history and the main explanatory variable(s). Therefore, the research within this thesis will be 
descriptive and will try to illustrate the situation as it truly is. Furthermore, the research will 
rely on inference and facts collecting, yet to avoid collecting just any facts the research will use 
hard data (statistics), combined with soft data  (observations) to make the results as valid as 
possible. 
Through narrative process-tracing, the thesis will take the reader through the political and 
economic history of the regions, wherein it pinpoints changes, implemented policies, economic 
results and changes in identity. This provides the research with a clear view of the relations 
between political parties, implementation of policies, and eventual economic outcomes.    
Since there have not been researches conducted that make a direct link between economic 
developments and dual-identity, the academic literature was used to create a theory that will be 
tested in this thesis. Therefore, the theoretical framework is constructed by assembling several 
theories on different features to add dimensions and variables to the research, in order to answer 
the hypotheses and the research question. 
The research contains a small-N analysis, thus will be comparing a limited number of cases 
to test the theory. There will be five cases, where one will act as a shadow case and the 
remaining four will be used for the comparative study. The cases have been chosen on their 
homogenous features in order to find the main explanatory variable. Furthermore, to keep a 
good overview of the timeline, the timeline has been dissected into four periods, which will 
later be more specific elaborated. 
Lastly, to avoid selective reporting, the data will be gathered from different institutions, and 
sources with different background and opinions, to increase reliability and validity.   
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5.1 Conceptualization and Operationalization 
Through the literature review and the theoretical framework, this thesis identified three 
concepts that could elaborate on how communities differ on economic development. The first 
concept; it is argued by the author of this thesis that communities keep a level of rationality 
when confronted with economic setbacks or successes, hence economic disparities are an 
essential key to identify the economic-development differences between communities. To 
operationalize this concept, a wide collection of variables have to be collect, therefore by 
measuring the economic growth through Gross Regional Product (GRP), the GRP per capita, 
unemployment rate and the governmental expenditure, it is possible to indicate the standard of 
living per region. With this information, the research hopes to demonstrate that the economic 
development was consisting of reactive sequences. Furthermore, the research will add the 
independent variables; product specialization and sectoral distribution of employment, to the 
economic dimension, in order to demonstrate actual points of difference among communities.  
However, economic development must not be equated with economic growth or strength. 
Development heavily depends on the policies created and implemented by central, regional, 
and local political parties, however the concept of economic development changes the focus. 
Due to the autonomous status of the communities, the regions hold the power to determine its 
own economic policies. Therefore, the concept of political economic policies are 
operationalized by looking at the background of the political parties - that were in seats at 
different time periods - to identify them as being active only regional or national. 
Furthermore, the policies of the political policies will be analysed to measure the different 
policies through time and their effects, as well as the differences of policies among the political 
parties of other communities.  
Last concept is directly linked with the previous concept. Political parties are often chosen 
based on the identity and self-interest of citizens, the last concept will therefore be the dual-
identity within regions. By going through statistics of previously done researches regarding the 
identity within regions through time, it is possible to identify if citizens of a region have felt a 
change in their identity and see if this had a direct correlation with the political and economic 
shifts. The concept will be divided into three different types of identity; Ethno-territorial, Dual, 
and National, and will be measured according to the works of Moreno, and Bollen & Medrano 
(Moreno, 2002) (Bollen et al, 1998). The variables in the data of Moreno and Bollen et al 
consist out of: Only (region), more (region) than Spanish, As (region) as Spanish, More Spanish 
than (region), Only Spanish, and do not know. The latter will not be given an identity, whereas 
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the first two option will be labelled under ethno-territorial, the middle as a dual-identity, and 
the remaining two will receive the label of being a national identity.   
5.2 Case selection 
The formulation of the research question limits the case selection to the autonomous 
communities of Spain. Albeit there being 17 autonomous communities and two autonomous 
cities, the thesis is also limited in its time to conduct a large scale research to take all 
communities into account. Therefore, the research will use five units of analysis in order to 
answer the research questions. The selection of the five cases differ in order to create a correct 
comparison to identify differences and/or similarities. 
The cases selected for the research are the communities; Andalusia, the Valencian 
Community, the Community of Madrid, Castilla and León, and Castilla-La Mancha. The 
justification of choosing Andalusia and the Valencian Community is first on their geographical 
location. Murias, Novello & Martinez (2012) conducted a research to display the well-being of 
the regions in Italy & Spain and discovered that in the south of the countries the regions were 
poorer than the north (Murias; Novello & Martinez, 2012). Nevertheless, they could not find 
any explanatory variable that could link the geographical position with the well-being of the 
regions. This research will neither try to find such a correlation between economic wealth and 
geographical position, yet it will take it into account in case for further researches by selecting 
two southern and two more centralized communities. When following the works of Castro 
(2006), it becomes clear that Andalusia’s economic strength was measured, in GRP per capita, 
as one of the lowest of Spain - around 40% underneath the national average - while the Valencia 
Community scored around the national average.   
Similar differences were found between Castilla and León, and Castilla-La Mancha. 
Although both communities are located closely on the same longitude, there are still economic 
differences among the two; Castile and León is economically wealthier, according to its GRP 
per capita - matching Valencia at the national average - than its counterpart Castilla-La Mancha 
- scoring around the 25% under national average (Castro, 2006: 289), whereas Castilla-La 
Mancha holds a stronger sense of national identity (Moreno, 2001: 402) than Castilla and León. 
Lastly is the community of Madrid that is chosen mainly of its history instead of its economic 
status or geographical position. Under the hegemony of Franco, Spain was a centralized nation 
with its Parliament located only in Madrid. The capital was the source of all policies and 
regulations for the whole nation, until the Spanish’s transition into democracy. The event makes 
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it enticing to observe if Madrid changed it policies or continued with it previous implemented 
ones, and to detect if these policies were effective.  
All the cases will be divided into two duos that will be compared at the end of each period. 
By comparing the ‘poorer’ region of the south with the ‘richer’ region of the north; Andalusia 
versus Castile and León, and vice versa; Valencia versus Castilla-La Mancha, this thesis hopes 
to reveal the main explanatory variable that can then be used for similar researches with other 
communities.    
5.3 Period selection 
In order to trace the process of economic development amidst communities, the report has 
to return to the initiation of the autonomous communities from where it can evaluate the process 
until the beginning of the economic crisis. Therefore, the timeline of thirty years is dissected 
into four periods that will be identified as critical junctures.  
The identification of the critical juncture is conducted through the theory of historical 
institutionalism and consulting the Spanish real GDP. As mentioned before, critical junctures 
are short periods of time, where the institutions are vulnerable for change. When consulting 
with the Spanish real GDP (table 1), there are changes observable in the graph. Of course, 
changes are not unusual, especially when looking at GDP, but the number of the changes that 
significantly changed the trajectory as just a few.  
The first one occurs around 1978 when the new Spanish constitution was signed and 
communities started to get their autonomous status; this period will therefore be defined as the 
initial conditions: The transition into democracy. 
The trajectory changes again in 1982 and continues until 1986, it is in this period that the 
first regional elections were held and new policies were adopted or maintained (Colomer, 
1998), this period will be labelled as: First regional parliaments.  
The third period is noticeable in 1986, when Spain enters the European Union and starts to 
receive European funding and experiences an increase of tourism. This growth continues until 
1993, when Spain is struck by an economic crisis. This period will be identified as: Accession 
into the European Union.  
The last period is the straight line from 1993 until 2008, wherein Spain is recovering from 
the crisis and is experiencing economic growth, this will be known as: The economic growth.  
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By dividing the timeline into four sections, it gives a better insight on the critical junctures, 
to see how changes occurred and if these moments of time hold the main explanatory variable 
on why communities differ.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1. The Spanish real GDP 1960-2015 (Trading Economics, 2017) 
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6. Process-tracing the Autonomous Communities 
This chapter will follow the history of the five aforementioned autonomous communities, 
narrating how they encountered and responded to historical events, economic changes, political 
contention, and evolving self-identification.  
Dissecting the timeline into four sections, it allows this thesis to create concentration points 
wherein it can go into more details about the events, thus constructing a valid trace of the 
processes that occurred between the Spanish transition into democracy and prior to the 
economic crisis of 2008. After each section a comparison will be made to reveal the extent of 
the differentiation in economic development among the communities. 
Lastly, through process tracing it will become possible to display at the end of this chapter 
an accurate overview of all the events and the impacts they made, necessary to identify the 
points in time that were crucial in the strong differentiation amidst the thesis’ cases. 
6.1 1978-1982 Transition into Democracy 
Although the transition into democracy and the development of the constitution went 
relatively smooth, the timing however was poorly. The decentralisation process was extremely 
complex, since all autonomous communities had to start from zero and did not automatically 
received their autonomy. Furthermore, Spain dealt with a high continuous inflation - 28% 
inflation in 1977 (Trading Economics, 2017) - whereas the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979 slowly 
started to have an impact on the economies of Southern-European countries. 
However during the transition, the Spaniards were more concerned on the developments 
occurring in their own country rather than their neighbour States. Prior to the first election of 
1977, the majority of the Spaniards were extremely concerned with the high unemployment 
rate (Lancaster, 1984: 355) and the development of the regional autonomy. Furthermore, due 
to the fact that the regions did not yet have any autonomy, the first democratic election - since 
Franco’s hegemony – was only for the central government and contained merely national 
parties, since the regional parties were not yet recognized. The importance of this election was 
high, due to the fact that the first parties that would take place in the Central Parliament would 
play a major role in the creation of the new constitution. Therefore three parties were in favour 
to win the election; the social-democratic party (the Unión de Centro Democrático: UCD), the 
socialist party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español: PSOE), and the communist party (Partido 
Comunista de España: PCE) (Gobierno de España, 1977).  
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Each party had different ways to fight the economic setbacks that the Spaniards feared so 
much, and had their own ideas regarding the new power distribution within the State. The UCD 
advocated to minimize inflation, whereas the other two parties did not provided any clear 
propositions and remained vague in their election programs by supplying no concrete solutions 
(Hernández Puertolas, 1977: 54). 
During the general elections, it was of importance for 
the parties to indicate their preferences towards the new 
type of power structure within the State, since 
preparations to create the new constitution already 
started. The UCD and PSOE both were in favour of a 
decentralized State by granting autonomy to the 
communities (PSOE, 1977: 6) (Fontan, 1978), whereas 
the PCE was more in favour of a federal construction. 
Also the social structure of the UCD and PSOE were 
similar, both promoting the recognition and 
embracement of different cultures and languages - e.g. 
Catalonia, and Basque country. The PCE was in favour 
of federalism and regional identities, culture and 
tradition, but was carrying a negative image that it could 
not shake off; namely its image it received during the 
hegemony of Franco, that of taking all the property of the 
common in favour of the State (Gunther, Sani, & Shabad, 1988: 67). 
The UCD won the first election with 34.9% and occupied 167 seats in Parliament, whereas 
the PSOE followed with 29.4% and 118 seats, and the PCE with 9.3% of the votes and 20 seats 
(Table 1). Despite the victory, the UCD could not form a majority and decided to rule as a 
minority. Furthermore, due to the writing of the new constitution and the fact that the UCD was 
a minority in Parliament, the prime minister; Adolfo Suárez made a pact with the PSOE and 
PCE to agree and fix economic and social policies during the time needed for the new 
constitution to be designed and implemented (Badia, 1978). 
The pact - later known as the Moncloa pacts - made sure that the hyperinflation of the 
Spanish peseta was contained. Several measurements were implemented in order to realize the 
containment; (i) businesses became limited in their wage growth that was fixed at 22% in favour 
of the lowest salary, whereas in return (ii) businesses were allowed to terminate five percent of 
its workforce without any costs. (iii) Employees, on the other hand, were granted the right to 
Table 1. Election results 1977 & 1979 
(Congreso de los Diputados, 2003) 
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join trade unions. Next measurement was that (iv) the treasury of the Bank of Spain was only 
allowed to contain 40.000 million Spanish pesetas, and lastly (iv) the money supply and the 
devaluation of the peseta was realized by fixing the real value of the financial market in order 
to contain the inflation of the peseta (Gobierno de España, 1977). 
The pact of Moncloa stayed intact during the making of the constitution and it abated the 
inflation sufficiently to convince the public that the UCD’s policies were effective. However 
among the parties, there was still dissatisfaction and the UCD government ignored the Left’s 
pleas to implement employment policies and to reform welfare structures (Lancaster, 1984: 
359). Furthermore, the economic growth started to stagnate and was nothing compared with the 
economic catch-up with Europe under the hegemony of Franco that recorded an averaged 
economic growth of 11% per year, from 1961 until 1975 (DatosMacro, 2017). As a matter of 
fact, the economic growth of 1979 was almost zero percent and the unemployment rate 
skyrocketed, reaching in Andalusia around the 14%.   
Nevertheless, the successful transition into democracy - ignoring the dismay of the Basque 
country - an abated inflation, a concrete plan of action, and two tranquil years of governing, 
awarded the UCD a second term in the Parliament (Gobierno de España,1979). However this 
time, the opposition got stronger and were more motivated than before to resist the ideologies 
of the UCD. The increased unemployment rate from 6.8% to 8.5%, the reluctant attitude of the 
UCD to welfare reforms, and the inflation, even though abated, was still at its highest at around 
28% (Trading Economics, 2017), resulted that PSOE and the PCE collected more seats in 
Parliament (Table 1). 
Due to the fact that the constitution of 1978 was implemented, regional parties were allowed 
to enter the second central election. Therefore a shift from national parties towards regional 
parties can be monitored between the two elections. Furthermore, pressure increased on the 
national parties by regional parties to accelerate the process of decentralisation, which would 
add more levels within Spanish governance. This meant that political parties would now not 
only be active on the central level, but also on the regional and municipality level.  
The UCD was created by Adolfo Suárez firstly as a coalition rather than a political party. 
Due to their success in the first election, the UCD continued as a political party but with severe 
limitations. For example, the UCD lacked an organizational framework which made it difficult 
within the party to recognize any hierarchy. Also, due to the fact that the party evolved from a 
coalition between politicians from different backgrounds and ideologies, it never succeeded to 
incorporate a statement of ideological principles. Lastly, the party did not have enough 
members to be active on all the hierarchical levels of government (Gunther, 1986).    
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The UCD would, up until the 1982 election, lose a significant amount of voters which would 
eventually led to the party’s demise. The internal conflict within the party definitely played a 
role, however it was not the main cause. The UCD, in its first term, already was reluctant to 
implement employment policies, whereas it now wanted to cut unemployment benefits. The 
timing of the proposed cut did not favour well with the voters, and the PSOE initiated a motion 
of no confidence that did not obtained a parliamentary majority (Maravall, 1982: 59). 
The implementation of the constitution of 1978 played a major role in the evolving 
governmental structure of Spain. The constitution of 1978 further initiated the process of 
decentralisation, however the government did not automatically granted autonomy to every 
region. Beside Catalonia and the Basque country, whom received autonomy as early as 1979, 
other regions had to comply to certain criteria before being able to be recognized as a candidate 
for the Statute of Autonomy and to be accepted by the Congress of Deputies of Spain. First, a 
region had to implement the organic laws of Spain according to article 81 of the constitution 
(Span. const. 1978, art. LXXXI), and if a community did not wish to implement an organic law 
then it must handed in a proposal of change to the Congress and gain a majority of votes. 
Second, according to the organic law of autonomic financing (Ley orgánica de financiación 
autonómica), each region had to indicate the financial needs in its base year as an autonomous 
community (Ley 8, 1980, §1). Furthermore, it also had to identify the financial resources of its 
own system of its base year (Ley 8, 1980, §2), and a plan-of-action on how to manage all the 
financial resources, taxation, and the distribution of the central government’s funding (Ley 8, 
1980, §3). 
This procedure drastically slowed down the decentralisation process, to the disliking of many 
communities. Furthermore, the fact that communities had to indicate their financial needs, 
created competition among communities; the chance existed that a community would not 
receive sufficient funding, thus seek coalition with other regions, what could have a negative 
effects in the central government. Meaning that if regional parties would make strong coalitions 
in the central government, then it would be become difficult to govern in the best for the entire 
State, since most coalitions would want the best for their own communities.  
While the communities were continuously attempting to receive autonomy, they still had to 
depend on the central government to implement new economic policies to fight the stagnating 
economic growth, the high inflation, and the increasing unemployment rate. However, the 
transition into democracy, the new constitution, and the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 would haunt 
Spain and its communities longer than they expected.    
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6.1.1 Andalusia 
Andalusia through history has always competed with the region of Extremadura to avoid the 
recognition of being the poorest region in Spain. Although the region’s surface area covers 
around 17.3% of Spain, had the highest number of inhabitants - 16.8% in 1978 (Hebbert, 1982: 
109), and held three of the ten biggest cities in Spain, it failed to take an economic advantage 
of those numbers. 
Nevertheless, Andalusia is beside Catalonia and Madrid, one of the main supplier of the 
national GDP, generating from 1978 until 1982 an average GDP of 13.3%. Unfortunately, the 
high generated GDP - or in this case Gross Regional Product (GRP) - is accompanied by the 
highest rate of unemployment during that five year period in the entire State of Spain. Andalusia 
was not capable to stop the increasing rate of unemployment and desperately looked on to see 
it grow from 14.5% to 20.5% (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Economic data of Andalusia 1978-1982.  Calculation based on Bustos et al. (2008) and Maurel (1979). 
One of the reasons that the unemployment was rising was due to the redistribution of 
employment in the agriculture sector. The technological development that occurred during the 
economic growth between the 1960 and the 1975, made a lot of employees redundant (López, 
Carreras & Tafunell, 2005: 92). Therefore, the sectoral distribution of employment in Andalusia 
shifted slowly but certainly, during the years of 1978 until 1982 (Graph 2).  
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During the transition into democracy and the development of the constitution, Andalusia 
repeatedly pleaded to the central 
government that new and radical 
economic changes were needed. 
Nonetheless, the pleas fell on deaf 
ears since the government was 
focused on the transition rather than 
changing policies, hence the 
adoptions of the Moncloa pacts.  
The citizens of Andalusia nor the 
local politicians were pleased and 
after the 1979 election, they appealed for a referendum to gain autonomy for the region. The 
referendum was approved by the Congress of Deputies on the 28th of December, while 
experiencing much resistance of the UCD. The UCD knew that in the region of Andalusia, the 
majority had voted for the PSOE in the last two elections and feared that if the region would 
obtain autonomy it would be a too powerful region. Therefore the UCD initiated a campaign to 
persuade the Andalusian citizens to vote against the ratification of the autonomous status under 
the slogan “Andalusians, this is not your referendum. If you are going to vote, vote blank.” 
(Junta de Andalucia, 2012: 11). On the 26th of February, the citizens voted with 58% for yes, 
for the ratification, to the dissatisfaction of the UCD. The UCD tried to not recognize the 
referendum, which contributed to the motion of no confidence that soon would follow by the 
opposition. 
In December 1981 the Congress of Deputies ratified the autonomous status of Andalusia, 
whereas the King of Spain sanctioned the status on the 30th of December 1981.  
The political struggle that Andalusia underwent, was clear seen among the attitude of the 
citizens. When monitoring the sense of identity of the Andalusians, the latest events resulted 
that more Andalusians did not see themselves anymore as only Spaniards but have a more dual-
identity, that is to say that they feel equally Spanish as Andalusian (Table 3). Furthermore, a 
shift occurred towards an identity with which the citizens identify themselves quicker as 
Andalusian than Spanish.     
Graph 2. Calculation based on the source Zambrana (2002) 
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6.1.2. Comunitat Valenciana  
Valencia, in Spain known as the little cousin of Catalonia. After the 13th century when 
Barcelona invaded the territories of Valencia, a lot of Catalan influences remained with the 
Valencian borders (Guarner, 1999), although oppressed during the hegemony of Franco.  
In hindsight, many would say that the Valencian community shared the Catalonian 
resentment towards the Spanish nationality and identity after the death of France. However, 
during the transition into democracy, a strong connection with the Spanish identity was 
monitored among the Valencian citizens. Around twenty percent stated that they could identify 
themselves more with only the Spanish nationality rather than a regional or dual-identity. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the citizens indicated that they shared a mutually affection towards 
the regional and national identity (Table 4).  
The transition to an autonomous community went smooth, partial to the sense of nationalism 
among its citizens - thus a mutual respect towards the central government - but mainly to its 
desire to re-establish the medieval Generalitat Valenciana (Martín Cubas, 2007: 16). Also, 
many confusions resided due to the bilingual nature of the region and the strong dual-identity 
Table 3. Andalucian regionalism. Calculation based on Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1982b)   
Table 4. Valencian regionalism. Calculation based on Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1984) 
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that many of the Valencians hold, which placed Valencia always under a scope to figure out to 
whom it expressed its loyalty to; Catalonia or Madrid (Prytherch & Huntoon, 2005). 
Therefore, the autonomous status was desired by the region as an apparatus to differentiate 
itself and eliminate the confusion. When requested to give a description of the community to 
the Congress of Deputies, the region described itself as: “manifestation of the will to autonomy 
of the people of the Valencian provinces […] giving birth to Valencian autonomy as the 
integration of both currents of opinion that define any concept of Valencia’s unique 
culture.”(Ley Orgánica 5/1982 1 Julio, de Estatuto de Autonomía de la Comunidad 
Valenciana).  
Economically, the community of Valencia did not experienced too many setbacks; the GRP 
per capita was around the national average at € 3.160, as well as the unemployment rate at 
around seven percent (Table 5) at the beginning of 1978, nevertheless the community was not 
exceeding it expectations.  
 The region industrialized in the sixties and contributed to the explosive economic growth in 
that time period (Hebbert, 1982: 110), furthermore a rapid transition from agriculture to services 
and industry, confronted the region with economic and social policies that were not 
any more up-to-date (Gaja & Boira, 1994).  
With the central government being occupied with the transition and the statuses of autonomy 
- thus disregarding the economic problems - while Valencia continued to wait to receive its 
autonomous rights, the unemployment rate started to increase rapidly reaching a staggering 
16.5% at the end of 1982. Furthermore, the changes in the sectoral distribution of employment 
Table 5. Valencia economic data ‘78-‘82. Calculation based on Bustos et al. (2008), Maurel (1979) & INE 
(1988) 
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continued (Graph 3), 
simultaneously increasing the 
demand of financial resources 
to assist the changes in the 
appropriate way.  
On the 10th of July, the 
King of Spain sanctioned the 
autonomous status, giving 
Valencia the autonomy it so 
desired. It organized its 
regional elections on May the upcoming year.  
6.1.3 Community of Madrid. 
The community of Madrid was the last community to receive its autonomous rights. On the 
8th of November the autonomous status was ratified by the Congress of Deputies, however with 
a certain sense of controversy. The reason that Madrid was not one of the first communities to 
gain its autonomous status was due to political disputes, and symbolic arguments. 
Madrid has always been the capital of Spain - as a Kingdom or Republic - and the host of 
the nation’s Parliament. After the hegemony of Franco and during the reestablishment of 
democracy, the current Parliament was not per se in favour of a decentralized State. Therefore, 
during the creation of the new constitution, Parliament tried to negotiate with Catalonia, Basque 
Country, Navarra and Andalusia to come to a compromise that would not involve the 
autonomisation of the regions (Conversi, 2000). The failure of that compromise and the 
eventual implementation of the constitution meant that the current government had to seek other 
measures to encumber regions to gain autonomy. Furthermore, politicians believed that giving 
autonomy to the capital would inspire other regions to do the same, thus avoiding the subject 
entirely (Nieto & Alda, 1999).  
Graph 3. Calculation based on BDMORES. (2008) & Carreras (2005) 
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Table 6. Economic data Madrid ‘78-‘82. Calculation based on BDMORES. (2008), INE (1988) & Carreras (2005) 
After the implementation of the constitution, regions started to file for autonomy, whereas 
some provinces were still negotiating to unite and become a region (La Asamblea de Madrid, 
2017). The province of Madrid belonged to the historical region of Castile, and was embedded 
between what is now known as Castilla y León and Castilla-La Mancha. However, when 
autonomic developments started to occur, none of the provinces wanted to be in the same region 
as Madrid out of fear that Madrid would become supreme economically and socially. Therefore, 
Madrid fell back on article 144 of the constitution that declared that provinces could only 
receive autonomy if it was in the nation’s best interest (Span. const. 1978, art. CXLIV). 
The provinces that expressed concern regarding the probability of Madrid becoming 
economically supreme, had much evidence to do so. In 1978, the province of Madrid had a 
GRP of around €14.5 million, making it the third largest supplier of the Spanish GDP with 
Andalusia and Catalonia surpassing it. Although, even in Madrid the unemployment rate was 
high with 16%, the true economic strength of Madrid emerges with its GRP per capita of around 
€3.600, exceeding the national average by more than 4% (Table 6).  
The economic strength of Madrid lies in its status as a metropolis. The majority of 
unemployment in Spain resided from the agricultural sector, the increasing technology led to 
high terminations of contracts. The province of Madrid had almost no agriculture, registering 
from 1978 until 1982 an average of 1.5% being work active in agriculture. The high rate of 
unemployment in Madrid however originated in the construction sector of the province, which 
experienced a halt due to the economic setbacks (Alcaide, 1986) (Graph 4). 
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Although the politicians in 
Madrid were not very fond of 
the idea of becoming an 
autonomous community, how 
did the Madrilenians felt with 
the idea? It is tempting to 
state that since Madrid is the 
capital that a high level of 
nationalism would be likely 
to be present, however it 
seemed that a lot of diversity was present during the time period 1978-1982. The majority of 
Madrilenians felt mutually Spanish as Madrilenians, whereas a sole preference towards the 
Spanish nationality was represented by a minor 5%. That being said, in the period that provinces 
started to negotiate to become autonomous regions, the Madrilenians seemed to favour a 
preferences towards the Spanish nationality, but did not discard their Madrilenian roots (Table 
7), leading eventually to the public acceptance of the autonomous community of Madrid.  
 
6.1.4 Castilla y León 
Castilla and León is one of the oldest regions known in contemporary Spain. The region 
started out as the Kingdom of Castile in the year 900, and went on to become an independent 
entity in the late year 1000 (Martínez Díez, 2005: 9). During the second Spanish Republic, the 
feeling of regionalism quickly increased, which led that Valladolid soon became the epicentre 
of the Castellanoleonés regional movement.  
After the civil war of 1936 and the hegemony of Franco, the region was dissolved and 
dissected again into the former provinces, leading that a lot of the regionalisms was deteriorated 
and replaced with a strong sense of Spanish nationalism. However, the death of Franco and the 
Graph 4. Calculation based on BDMORES. (2008) 
Table 7. Madrilenian regionalism. Based on Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1992c) 
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development of the constitution, initiated a new movement that advocated for the 
reestablishment of the region Castile and León (Acevedo, 2009). The creation of several 
political parties and organization such as; the Regional Alliance of Castilla and Leon, the 
Regional institution of Castilla and Leon, and the Autonomic Nationalist Party of Castilla and 
Leon, indicated that different movements were active in the region.  
Nationalism rapidly lost ground within the region. In 1978, the majority of the inhabitants 
tended to feel more Spanish than regional, whereas slowly the feeling of a dual-identity started 
to emerge (Table 8).  
 
However, even with the emerging regional organization and parties, a strong support of a 
sole regional identity was not present. Arguably the reason to this phenomenon involves the 
division between the regional identity 
between the region Castilla and the 
region León. On the 16th of April 
1980, the province of León agreed with 
the request to propose the Autonomic 
status of Castilla and León to the 
Congress of Deputies, only to revoke 
its approval in 1983 when Parliament 
was looking at the matter. In the end, 
the Constitutional Court rejected the 
motion of León and continued the process (Gobierno de España, 1983).  
Castilla and León is the largest region of Spain, which uses its space to invest in 
agriculture. 
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Graph 5. Based on BDMORES (2008) 
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Table 9. Economic data Castilla & León 1978-82. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008) 
In the time period of 1978-1982, an average 27% of the region’s workforce was active in 
agriculture, whereas the other majority was active in the service sector with an average of 40% 
(Graph 5). This meant that the region generated an average GRP of €7.208 million, providing 
around 5% of the national GDP, whereas its GRP per capita circulated around € 2.700 which 
was 30% below the national average. Although, it may indicate that the standard of living of 
the region is below average, the region managed to keep its unemployment rate at average 
around 9% staying well under the nation’s unemployment rate of 11% (Table 9).  
6.1.5 Castilla-La Mancha 
The death of Franco led to a direct separation of the Castile region. The regionalist movement 
of Castilla and León identified the region of Castilla-La Mancha as La Castilla Nueva (The 
New Castilla) with the province of Madrid incorporated into the region, whereas Castilla and 
León dissociated itself. Castilla-La Mancha, albeit not accepting the name Castilla Nueva, did 
not resist the separation and tried to continue as a region on its own. The region did not have a 
strong sense of regionalism at the beginning of the transition into democracy, with 60% of its 
population leaning towards the Spanish nationality than the regional (Table 10). 
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Nevertheless, similar to the region of Castilla and León, regional groups started to arise with 
the continuation of time and the majority of regions obtaining autonomy. However even within 
Castilla-La Mancha, there were two streams of regionalism; Castellanismo (Castilianism), and 
Mancheguismo (Manchequianism) that advocated to have autonomy for their own regions; 
Castilla and La Mancha. Yet the two streams were not as extreme as the two streams of Castilla 
and León, and had similar standpoints; Castellanismo was in favour of the region Castilla 
Nueva, incorporating the provinces; Albacete, Toledo, Guadalajara, and Cuenca, whereas the 
Manchequianism movement preferred the region La Mancha, incorporating the provinces: 
Albacete, Toledo, Ciudad Real and Cuenca. However, the question remained which region 
would then incorporate the province of Madrid.  
Considering the disparities amidst the provinces compared to Madrid, the two streams in the 
end decided to collaborate and to establish the Union of Castilla-La Mancha (Castellanos 
López, 2015: 265-269). This union registered itself in the 1979 elections and went on to 
advocate the region of Castilla-La Mancha until it received its autonomous status in 1983. 
The disparities of Castilla-La Mancha compared with Madrid were fierce. The region 
generated in 1978 around €3.700 million in GRP, which is almost five times less what the 
province of Madrid generated in that year. Although the difference of GRP could be explained 
by other aspects; e.g. the population of Madrid is 4 times greater than Castilla-La Mancha, yet 
the GRP per capita does indicates that the standard of living might have been indeed lower in 
Castilla-La Mancha, with €2.200 compared with Madrid’s €3.600 GRP per capita. One upside 
for the region was it unemployment rate with a low 5%, making it the region with the lowest 
unemployment rate in 1978 (Table 11).  
Nevertheless looking at the framework the region could not escape the country’s economic 
setbacks since it soon encountered an increase of unemployment as well. 
Table 10. Castilian-Manchegan  regionalism. Based Centro Investigaciones Sociológicas (1992ª) 
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6.1.6 Regional comparison 
Andalusia versus Castilla and León 
Andalusia went into the transition with a strong sense of independence, its inhabitants 
already indicated that it had 
a strong sense to the 
Andalusian identity but 
stayed loyal to the Spanish 
government only if it would 
grant the region its 
autonomous status. The 
referendum and the intense 
pressure that the region put 
on the central government, 
indicates its strong dual-
identity. Castilla and León 
inhabitants however indicated that the majority felt more loyalty towards the national identity 
instead of a dual- or regional identity (Graph 6). Nevertheless, the region did not rejected the 
idea of the autonomous status, yet was one of the last to apply for it. The possibility to receive 
the autonomous status after the signing of the constitution, did initiate a clear shift towards a 
dual-identity among the Castilla and León citizens. 
Graph 6. Identity comparison Andalusia versus Castilla & León 
Table 11. Economic Data Castilla-La Mancha. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008) 
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The transition in democracy and the reception of the autonomous status did mean that the 
communities had to begin from zero, meaning that financial and social institutions had to be 
established. The economic status did not start from scratch, meaning that Andalusia and Castilla 
and León already had showed significant economic disparities. The obvious disparities such as 
the total GRP generated between the communities can be explained by the large difference in 
active workforce of the dyad. Furthermore, the GRP per capita also differs significantly, with 
Andalusia generating from 1978 until 1982 an average € 3.018, 24% below the national 
average. Castilla and León had an average of €2.764 that was 30% below the national average, 
which could indicate that Andalusia was economically wealthier than Castilla and León, 
however Andalusia did coop with the highest unemployment rate of Spain with an average of 
17%, whereas Castilla and León had an average of just 9%.  
Therefore it can be argued that at the period around the signing of the constitution, both 
communities were economically equal. The spending on education at that time was done by the 
central government and spent the funding equally among the regions, which would, considering 
its size, be disadvantageous for Andalusia. 
 
Valencia versus Castilla-La Mancha 
At the time of signing the constitution, Valencia was an economic wealthy region. With its 
GRP providing 10% of the nation’s GDP and its GRP per capita being slightly under the 
national average with 1.71%. However, the oil crisis of 1979 did had its effects on the region, 
signifying that the previous gap of 1.71% with the national average of the GRP per capita 
expanded to an incredible 35% under the national average in 1980. 
Castilla-La Mancha already went into the transition with a great economic disparity 
compared with Valencia. The GRP per capita of the region was at €2,268 far below the national 
average by 28%. Nevertheless, 
the region matched Valencia with 
the unemployment rate indicated 
that the region of Castilla-La 
Mancha was relative 
economically stable. For 
example, in 1980 after viewing 
the Valencian drop in it GRP per 
capita compared to the national 
average. The drop of Castilla-La Graph 7. Identity Comparison Valencia vs. Castilla-La Mancha 
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Mancha was significantly less, widening the gap from a difference of 27% to 35%, matching 
Valencia. However, Valencia quickly recovered in the following year by reducing the gap, 
whereas Castilla-La Mancha enlarged the gap to 47%. 
Regarding the identities, the region of Valencia had a strong sentiment towards having a 
dual-identity, most likely due to the Catalonian influences far into history. Even though, with 
the signing of the constitution and the oil crisis, the sentiment of the Valencian citizens did not 
waver and maintained a strong dual-identity. In the region of Castilla-La Mancha, there was a 
clear inner struggle visible regarding their identity. Whereas the community had a strong 
national identity at the beginning of the transition, it saw an increasing change towards a dual-
identity as long as the economic difficult continued. 
 
Shadow case Madrid 1978-1982 
Madrid differed on many aspects with the other regions; first and most important aspect 
was the application of article 144 of the constitution, to grant Madrid - as the only province - 
the autonomous status. Furthermore, the community of Madrid almost did not have any 
agriculture present in its province, and most of its GRP was generated through the service 
sector. Lastly, when granted the autonomous status, the community became one of the richest 
regions in Spain with its GRP per capita 4% above the national average, as well as an important 
supplier to the national GDP with 11% in the period 1978-1982 (Graph 8).  
Although, the Madrilenian GRP was high and its GRP per capita fluctuating around the 
national average, it did had a high unemployment rate averaging 14%, compared with the 
national average of 10%.   
Graph 8. GRP per capita per region ‘78-‘82. Calculation based on INE (1988) & BDMORES 
(2008).  
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Therefore, the community invested its expenditure mainly on the improvement of 
institutions, social benefits, subsidies and other investments, adding up to 58% or €870 million. 
The other investments existed out of; 21% in infrastructure, 15% in education and 6% in 
healthcare respectively. 
Compared with the remain four communities, Madrid had the highest GRP per capita, the 
most expenditure of its GRP spent on education and healthcare, but did not had the lowest 
unemployment rate. However, considering it was merely above the national average with the 
unemployment, whereas it scored above average on the other dimensions, it might be stated 
that Madrid’s economic development was the furthest of the remaining for regions.   
6.2 1982-1986 The First Regional Parliaments 
The UCD was now leading its second term in the central government of Spain, however its 
success was quickly deteriorating. The continuous economic setbacks, the cuts in 
unemployment benefits and the obstruction of the autonomous status of Andalusia, made the 
public lose trust in the party. Subsequently, internal affairs became grim after vital members of 
the party left as a result of internal dispute, and the party started to show cracks in its ideology. 
The disarray became so apparent that after the failed motion of no-confidence and the coup 
d’état in 1981, the President called for snap elections.  
The PSOE grabbed the situation into their advantage and obliterated the UCD in the 1982 
elections. The UCD led the worst loss in West-European history by losing 93% of its seats in 
Parliament and 80% of it votes. The PSOE now led the Parliament with a clear majority with 
the Popular Alliance (AP) as its first serious contender in the opposition. 
The PSOE now in charge of the central government, first tried to attack the increasing 
unemployment among regions. However, it was more a political statement than an actual 
declaration of war, since the PSOE did not believe that unemployment was the true problem of 
the State, but the high inflation (Solchaga, 1997). Therefore, to maintain the inflation low, the 
economic policies of the PSOE would be the adaptation of strict wage moderation and 
restrictive monetary policies (Recio & Roca, 1998) (Sanchez de Dios, 1998).  
The implementation of the constitution however meant that a new level of governance was 
created in the governmental hierarchy, thus the regions that received their autonomous status 
were allowed to hold their own regional elections. The economic impediments left its marks on 
high number of regions, whereas the trust in the central government had fallen to its lowest 
point (CIS, 2015). To no surprise, the turnouts of these elections were high with an average of 
70%, since the citizens were hoping for the change they so desired. 
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Nevertheless, a new challenge laid ahead for the political parties, since a new type of 
governance was introduced. National parties now had to take on regional parties who could 
have more insights in the region, more trust of the region’s inhabitant, or more knowledge of 
the regional disparities. Furthermore, parties that were active on a national level had to make 
sure that their regional policies stayed aligned with their national policies and vice versa. 
In the end, the first central government failed to implement economic or social policies in 
the regions to fight the economic imperils and social disparities. Therefore, the outcome of the 
first regional elections was vital for the future of the regions. 
6.2.1 Andalusia 
Andalusia entered its first regional elections in 1982, with great deficits. The region surpassed 
the 20% with its unemployment rate and its GRP per capita started to drop significantly at the 
beginning of the year. Furthermore, after the whole debacle with the UCD, regionalism started 
to increase among the Andalusians – 60% to 69% (Table 12). 
On the 23rd of May 1982, Andalusia allocated 66 seats (52.2%) to the PSOE, which led to 
the party’s majority in the Andalusian Parliament. The socialist party had a difficult task on its 
hand, since the region did not yet had any institutions to monitor economic or social changes, 
nor did the region have any policies.  
 
The PSOE is a national political party and tried to maintain its regional policies coherent 
with its national policies. The objective of the PSOE was to create a minimum of 800,000 new 
jobs by investing in the two sectors that were struck the hardest by the previous economic crises; 
the agricultural and industrial sector. Furthermore with a strict policy to maintain prices of 
certain services; health, transport and basic needs, low and affordable, the party hoped to 
increase the standard of living of the State and regions (PSOE, 1982: 15) (Fuente, Vives, Dolado 
& Faini, 1995: 15).  
Remarkable, the PSOE decided to take a different approach with Andalusia and constructed 
a planning commission existing of 15 individual committees to create a plan to help the region 
Table 12. Andalucian regionalism. Calculation based on Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1982b). 
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to development economically as effective and efficient as possible (Bukowski, 2002). The 
economic plan of Andalusia indicated that the region indeed lacked institutions and policies 
necessary to improve the standard of living. The plan identified the problems and created three 
main objectives; the first objective was to reduce the unemployment rate and increase the 
activity rate. The plan indicated that the market must generate jobs through profitable and 
competitive businesses within a mixed economic framework with limited external aids and 
subsidies, pulling the unemployment rate up to national level (Junta de Andalucia, 1984: 46). 
Second objective was the obtainment of a more balanced development of the different 
productivity sectors in Andalusia. The balance of the sectors must resemble the national level, 
whereas no sector must be more powerful than the other nor be more exclusive (Ibid, 1984: 
46). 
Last main objective was to obtain a fairer distribution among wealth and income, making 
for an approach of collective equipment levels to those corresponding to the national level (Ibid, 
1984: 46). 
To meet the objectives, the PSOE adopted nine new economic policies inspired by the 
economic plan and in combination with its own party’s ideology. During the development of 
the policies the PSOE attempted to ‘lock’ the process for a certain amount of time, signifying 
that once the policies were implemented, it would be costly or extremely complicated to reverse 
or change to process. The following nine policies were inaugurated: 
I. Reforming the agricultural 
sector and reconstruct the 
fishery. 
II. Develop and rationalize the 
industrial sector. 
III. Create a new form of tourism 
and improve the performances 
of the trading sector. 
IV. Mobilizing financial resources, 
accentuate regionalization of the 
credit system. 
V. Introducing employment 
promotion programs. 
VI. Adaptation of productive 
structures to enable integration 
to the Economic European 
Communities (EEC). 
VII. Orientation of the territory: 
territorial articulation, 
commercialization, spatial 
distribution of the investments. 
VIII. Improvement of collective 
facilities: education, culture, 
health, social assistance, 
environment and housing. 
IX. Investing in communication and 
transportation. 
(Junta de Andalucia, 1984: 48)  
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The plan, however, did fail to specify the timeframe in which these objectives must be met. 
It did state that the implementations of the new policies are to be implemented within the 
timeframe of 1984-1986, but missed the total estimation of the process. 
Furthermore the PSOE rejected regionalism as the ideology of the new Parliament, quickly 
dismissing the focus on only education and cultural development, and tried with the new 
policies to link autonomy with regional economic development.  
Obviously the implementations of the new policies would unlikely to have immediate effect, 
it nevertheless gave the Andalusians the thought that the situation was under control. However 
economically speaking, Andalusia continued to decline with its employment rate hitting a 
critical point of 28% (Table 12). The GRP of Andalusia had a rough patch during 1983, but 
manage to recover during the year following up to 1986. The sectoral distribution of 
employment did not show any big changes or shifts, therefore feeding the argument that the 
growing GRP was a result of the strong drop of the inflation rate (Trading Economics, 2017). 
6.2.2 Comunitat Valenciana 
On the first of July 1982, the community of Valencia celebrated the return of the 
Autonomous Status which it had lost 270 years ago. To commemorate the moment, Valencia 
restored its Generalitat (Parliament) with which it aimed to govern the region. 
The first regional election of Valencia, commenced in May 1983 with six political parties of 
which two were of regional decent; Unión Valenciana (UV), and Unitat del Poble Valenciá 
(UPV). The PSOE also participated but under the alias; Partido Socialista del País Valenciana 
Table 12. Economic Data Andalucia 1983-86. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008) 
& Zambrana et al. (2005) 
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(PSPV), creating the sentiment of acting like a regional party, since the region expressed to 
have a dual-identity (Table 13). The UV participated together with the Popular Alliance (AP) 
in one ticket, whereas the UPV tried to participate solo. 
 
Of the 89 seats in the Valencian Parliament, 51 seat were won by the PSPV, 32 by the 
Popular Coalition (AP-UV-PDP-UL) and 6 by the Communist Coalition (PCE & PCPV), giving 
the PSPV the majority in the Generalitat. 
Since the Valencian community restated the Generalitat and the institutions that were 
connected with it, it was easier for political parties to locate disparities or economic flaws within 
the region or system. The economic problems within the region already lied in the significant 
change in the sectoral distribution of employment, with an increase of industry since the early 
1960s. However, the old infrastructure of the community - dating way back to the 700 AD when 
the Moors ruled the lands - was only suited for agriculture (Prytherch & Maiques, 2009). 
Therefore, the PSPV was now in an inner conflict, regarding the necessary steps for Valencia. 
In its election program the party advocated an equal distribution between the sectors (PSOE, 
1982), although changing the infrastructure in favour of the industrial sector could affect the 
agricultural sector.  
In 1984, the Valencian Parliament presented the plan; “The city we always wanted 
(Ajuntament de Valencià, 1984).” wherein the parties announced the initiation of several big 
projects as well the cancellation of a few undertakings. The planned construction of a new 
central freeway was cancelled, whereas the funding and the locations were used to construct 
urban parks, a new concert hall in the capital Valencia, new avenues, and the reconstruction of 
the beachhead promenades along the regional coast (Prytherch et al, 2009: 108). Therefore, the 
elements of the General plan of 1966 were cancelled, such as the reduction of urban land and 
improvement of current facilities, and replaced by the extension of the region’s infrastructure. 
Albeit not stated in the plan itself, it seems that the Generalitat decided to invest more into 
infrastructure - thus construction - to balance the sectors. 
Table 13. Valencian regionalism ‘83-‘86. Calculation based on Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1984) 
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The new changes did not have a direct effect on the economic situation of Valencia; the GRP 
kept rising, albeit that could be partially explained by the low inflation rates (Trading 
Economics, 2017), as well the GRP per capita (Table 14). Furthermore, no direct changes could 
be detected in the sectoral distribution of employment or of the GRP, and the unemployment 
rate increased as well but stayed underneath national level. 
 
6.2.3 Community of Madrid 
At the start of the first regional election for Madrilenian Asamblea of 1983, the region 
maintained a healthy economy with its GRP, and its GRP per capita far above the nation’s 
average by 25%. Furthermore, it experienced a continuous growth in the industrial sector, 
whereas the development within the service sector proved to be effective as well. Nevertheless, 
the community seemed to continuously struggle with its unemployment rate after what seemed 
two years of stabilization - 1980 & 1981. Therefore, the main focus of the first election was 
around stability within the community, and improvements of the economic and social policies 
(Lancaster, 1984).  
Five parties entered the election of which none of them were considered regional parties. 
Not surprisingly due to fact that regionalism was almost not present in the community during - 
and even after - the elections were taking place; 52% of the Madrilenians felt more Spanish 
than Madrilenian, a sentiment that would strengthen with 4% from 1983 until 1986 (CIS, 1992c) 
(Table 15).  
Table 14. Economic Data Valencia 1983-86. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008) 
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The PSOE, the People Coalition (AP-PDP-UL), and the PCE were the contenders to win the 
majority of seats. Adolfo Suárez, founder of the dissolved UCD, tried to enter with his new 
party the Democratic and Social Centre (CDS), whereas the Liberal Democratic Party also tried 
to obtain its first ever seats.  The PSOE won the election by winning 50.5% of the votes, giving 
the party 51 seats in the chamber of 94. The People Coalition again became the biggest 
opposition securing 34 seats, whereas the communist party received the remaining the 9.  
Due to the long history of Madrid, the community had already well-integrated institutions 
that were monitoring and guiding all the contemporary policies. Furthermore, the PSOE stated 
in its electoral programme that it wanted a good sectoral distribution and the reduction of the 
unemployment rate (PSOE, 1982). However, the distribution in Madrid seemed to function 
accordingly, even though there was almost no agriculture within the region. The institution of 
economics (Consejería de Economía y Hacienda) indicated that the reason of the growing 
unemployment rate originated from the increasing flow of internal and external migrants to the 
community (Colectivo, 1993). The economic successes of the community combined with a high 
standard of living made the community attractive for immigrants, but also national jobseekers, 
to migrate to the city in order to find work. Furthermore, there was another trend detected; many 
inhabitants of the region were moving from the city centres to the outer urban rings. The PSOE 
saw this as an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone, meaning to improve the infrastructure 
of the region as well as to create work opportunities in the construction sector. More than 50 
teams were assembled in 1982 to eventual create the General plan of 1985. The construction 
would begin the next year and would take until the early months of 1997 to finish (Álvarez, 
2001).  
No other new policies were implemented by the PSOE except the ones that connected with 
the macroeconomic policies of the party in the central government. The region of Madrid would 
continue to grow during the time period 1983 until 1986 without any drastic changes; the GRP 
per capita would stay around 23% above national average, whereas the unemployment rate 
would continue to fluctuate between 15% and 19%.  
Table 15. Madrilenian regionalism ’83-’86. Calculation based on Centro de investigaciones sociológicas (1992c) 
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6.2.4 Castilla and León 
The transition of the region Castilla and León into autonomy did not went as smooth as 
aforementioned regions. The fact that the Constitutional Court and the Congress of Deputies 
passed the proposal of the Autonomous Status of Castilla and León, while León revoked its 
permission, resulted in a retaliation in form of massive demonstrations. 90 thousand Leonese 
citizens went on the street to demonstrate and to put pressure on the Parliament to recognize 
the autonomy of León (Berjón, 1984).  
In 1983, the first election of the region Castilla and León thus started with some tension. The 
PSOE, People Coalition and the Communist Party all were present, as well as the Democratic 
and Social Centre and the Liberal Party. Considering the tensions, the delegation of León decide 
to participate as well to by entering with the Regional Party of the Leonese Country (PREPAL). 
Unfortunately, it seemed that the inhabitants of Castilla and León were more concerned with 
economic features than autonomic affairs. The PSOE won the election by a margin, collecting 
the 42 seats of the 84, whereas the People Coalition followed with 39. 
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According to surveys, the majority of the inhabitants did not feel that much affection towards 
a sole regional identity (Table 16), however considering the strong opposition visualized by 
large demonstrations and the creation of a political party, it could be assumed that there is a 
strong regionalist core present in the León district. Before the PSOE was able to introduce any 
of its policies, firstly it had to solve this conflict, whereas secondly it had to reorganize within 
the party as well. The regional delegation of the PSOE was divided between two candidates to 
lead the party; Demetrio Madrid López and José Constantino Nalda. The former led the 
campaign prior to the elections and was with a small margin the favourite within the party to 
become the leader. 
However, Demetrio was recovering from illness and stated that he would probably be too 
weak to fulfil the position. Furthermore, Demetrio was an advocate for the autonomous status 
of Castilla and León and disproved the status for both regions. José Constantino was a respected 
professor at the university of Valladolid and work active in the city council, where he was more 
lenient toward the motion of an autonomous León (Rosa, 2011: 2). 
While the PSOE was electing their new leader, the problems continued in Castilla and León; 
depopulation, increasing unemployment, inadequate infrastructure and a declining quality of 
the industrial sector. The PSOE did not introduce new specialized policies for the region, yet 
instead concentrated on the effects of the policies on the national level. However to synchronize 
with those policies, the party had to invest the funding - 3.6 million pesetas in 1984 - it received 
from the central government. The PSOE decided to invest in the infrastructure to further 
urbanize the cities in the region, and to stop a halt to the decreasing industry (Ibid, 2011: 7). 
Table 16. Castilian-Leonese regionalism ’83-’86. Calculations based on Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1992c)  
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Similar to the other regions, Castilla and Leon had an improvement of their GRP, but had to 
deal with an increasing unemployment rate as well. Furthermore, the division between the 
Castillians and the Leonese was stronger than imagined to an extent it even affected the 
functionality of within the PSOE. 
 
6.2.5 Castilla-La Mancha 
Albeit regionalism was present in the region of Castilla-La Mancha, it was less fierce than 
its neighbour; Castilla and León. Therefore, after receiving the autonomous status, the 
inhabitants quickly went back to business and prepared themselves for the first regional 
elections (Table 18). 
 
The region is always known for its high level of industrial and agricultural worker, hence it 
is known under the nickname; the region of workers (Ortega, 2010). It therefore does not come 
as a surprise that the PSOE was holding the best cards to win the first election in Castilla-La 
Mancha. Only national parties, such as the People Coalition, and the PCE, entered the election, 
Table 17. Castilla & Leon economic data ’83-’86. Based on database BDMORES (2008) & INE (1988) 
Table 18. Castilian-Manchegan identity. Based on database Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1992a) 
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whereas the regional party; Union of Castilla-La Mancha did not participate, but was rather 
divided amidst the national parties that participated. 
The PSOE won marginally from the People Coalition, dividing the 44 seats – 23 to 21 – and 
immediately started to arrange the agenda. The region had a balanced distribution of 
employment with the industrial and agricultural sector occupying almost 50% of the workforce, 
which considered the PSOE to not implement new policies to affect that balance. However, the 
region had a problem of depopulation; more inhabitants were leaving the regions, whereas a 
small number was replaced by immigrants. Furthermore, the region had an outdated 
infrastructure, and no higher education system (Bolós, 2009). 
The PSOE decided to stop focusing on the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, whereas 
it started to identify public areas that needed investments. The PSOE started to invest in public 
health care and social institutions; e.g. institutions to integrate and educate immigrants, so that 
they could be added faster to the work active population (Bolós, 2009). The PSOE invested €20 
million in the first two years (Bustos et al, 2008), whereas the following two years the most 
investments would be made in the recently founded University of Castilla-La Mancha and the 
education system (Ibid, 2008). Furthermore, the PSOE would during its first term, invest 
approximately 51% of its budget to improve the infrastructure among the provinces in the 
region and increase spending on urbanization. 
Another point on the political agenda that the party identified as very important, was the 
abatement of regionalism. By improving the infrastructure and increasing the urbanization 
within the region, the PSOE hoped to motivate the inhabitants to mix through the region, thus 
avoid clusters wherein certain radicalization would be halted (Ortega 2010). 
Albeit the unemployment rate remained high from 1983 until 1986, it stagnated significantly 
whereas in 1986 it slightly decreased. Furthermore, the standard of living gradually started to 
improve, tilting the GRP per capita from €3.029 in 1983 to €4.437 in 1986. It were these 
developments that satisfied the inhabitants that openly expressed their satisfaction to the PSOE 
(CIS, 1987), which eventually led to a second term for the party. 
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6.2.6 Regional Comparison 1983-1986 
Andalusia versus Castilla and León 
Both the communities Andalusia and Castilla and León chose the PSOE in its first regional 
election to be their representative in their Parliament. Although the PSOE was considered as a 
national party it still approach the communities differently, whereas different policies were 
implemented. 
Economically, both communities were having difficulties to keep their unemployment rates 
down, whereas economic growth stagnated as well. Therefore, it may be assumed that the PSOE 
would apply similar strategies, while simultaneously adopting similar strategies. However, the 
PSOE recognized the lack of institutions in Andalusia and quickly set up an economic plan for 
the development of the region. Furthermore, it created strategies and policies in order to fulfil 
the objectives the party had set for 
the region and on a central level. 
Therefore, the PSOE in Andalusia 
spent a total of € 3.2 billion in its 
first term, trying to distribute it as 
equally as possible.  
In Castilla and León, the PSOE 
was confronted with internal 
hindrances due to the Leonese 
Table 20. Expenditure comparison Andalusia-Castilla & León. Based on 
database BDMORES (2008) 
Table 19. Castilla-La Mancha economic data. Based on database BDMORES (2008) & INE (1988) 
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regionalism within the party. This internal conflict limited the party to establish a clear ideology 
for the community, whereas it was hindered in its policy making due to a large diversity of 
perspectives. Therefore, most policies that were implemented were according to the electoral 
programme that were mainly focused on the improvement of infrastructure and wage control. 
Thus at the end of the PSOE first term, a total of €1.7 billion was invested in the community of 
which 48% in infrastructure and 37% in improving the region’s institution network, social 
benefits, and subsidies. 
The period of 1983 until 1986 did not brought a lot of significant changes economically or 
socially. The Andalusians remained trustworthy towards their regional identity, whereas 
Castilla and León remained divided by the dual-identity and the national identity (53%/41%). 
 
Valencia versus Castilla-La Mancha 
The period between 1983 and 1986 was unstable due to the many changes in Spain and the 
repercussions of the oil crisis. Valencia nor Castilla-La Mancha could avoid the effects and saw 
their unemployment rate increase and their economic growth stagnate, similar to Andalusia and 
Castilla & León. With the first regional election, both communities elected a socialist party for 
their first regional Parliament, although Valencia opted for a regional party that was based on 
the ideology of the PSOE, whereas Castilla-La Mancha elected the PSOE. 
The Generalitat of Valencia started to invest mostly in the construction sector, even though 
the central policy of the PSOE had a preference to an equal distribution. Nevertheless, the PSPV 
saw an opportunity in the increasing tourism of the country, and started to invest in its 
infrastructure. Furthermore, it also detected that the infrastructure needed reform in order to 
provide the agriculture and industrial sector the opportunity to expand. Lastly, the PSPV wanted 
to improve its ports and harbour to initiate more international trade. 
The PSOE in Castilla-La Mancha 
was more concerned with the increasing 
regionalism in the region. Therefore to 
comply with the central policies, the party 
invested in urbanization to fight the 
depopulation in the community and to 
stimulate citizens to relocate through the 
provinces. Furthermore, the PSOE in 
Castilla-La Mancha wanted to develop the 
social situation the region, thus wanted to invest more in social institutions. 
Table 21. Expenditure comparison Valencia-Castilla-La Mancha. 
Based on database BDMORES (2008) 
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At the end of the term, the PSPV invested a total of € 2 billion, of which 36% was invested 
in the infrastructure, whereas the remaining 64% was invested in education, healthcare, social 
benefits, subsidies and institutional development. The PSOE in Castilla-La Mancha invested a 
total of €960 million of which 56% was invested in infrastructure and the remaining 44% was 
mostly invested in social benefits, and subsidies. 
Lastly, the development did not affect directly the identity of the citizens of both 
communities. Valencia remained having a majority that indicated to prefer or feel a dual-
identity, whereas the citizens of Castilla-La Mancha was divided between the regional and the 
national identity. As a matter of fact, the national identity of Castilla-La Mancha slowly became 
stronger after witnessing a small shift from a dual identity towards a sole national identity.     
 
Shadow case Madrid 1983-1986 
With the first regional election, the community of Madrid elected the PSOE to represent 
their Asamblea. However, it did not initiated sudden changes or the introduction of new 
policies. Although, the PSOE continued its policies of the central level; e.g. maintaining wage 
control and trying to distribute wealth equally, it did not do so regarding the economic 
policies. The PSOE advocated governmental expenditure, arguing that government spending 
fuels economic prosper, and fights inflation and unemployment, therefore the economic 
policy was to spend 5% of the region’s GRP.  Nevertheless, the PSOE spent in its first term 
an average 2.9% of its GRP, a total of €2.5 billion in the region, far below its target. Around 
28% was invested in infrastructure, a small increase before the regional elections, whereas 
13% and 6% was invested in education and healthcare. The remaining 53% was invested in 
institutions, subsidies and other investments in the region. 
The results of the reduced expenditure might be seen in the unemployment rate - albeit 
economic institutions stated that it was the result of exogenous influences - increased to 18%. 
Yet aside the increase, the community underwent a steady growth, with its GRP per capita 
above national average by 25% and its GRP supplying 16% of the national GDP. It continued 
to outperform the other regions (Graph 9) 
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6.3 1987-1993 Accession into the European Union. 
On the 11th of June 1985, the Council of the European Communities allowed the accession 
of the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of Portugal in the European Union (EC, 1985). 
This decision was new milestone for Spain and meant an increase of opportunities due to 
trading agreements and extra funding. On January the first, 1986, the Kingdom of Spain was 
officially a State Member of the EU, which it hoped to be since the fall of the Francoist regime 
in 1975. 
However, the accession did not come that easily. Many European Members, especially 
France and the Benelux, were hesitant if the Spanish economy was stable enough to enter the 
EU. The national unemployment was 18% at the beginning of 1986, whereas inflation was still 
circulating around 8-10 percent. Furthermore, the industrial sector was in dire need of structural 
reforms and the heavily dependence of Spain on its agriculture was also worrying for most of 
the EU-members (Royo & Manuel, 2003: 12-13). Therefore, during the negotiations for the 
Spanish accession, appointments were between Spain and the EU that Spain would receive 
investments to improve those two sectors in order to keep up with the European development. 
However, due to underlying doubts, Spain would get funding but in return would become a net 
contributor to the EC budget (Solsten & Meditz, 1988). Nevertheless, the Spaniards were not 
objecting since they finally had the feeling of acceptance in the Western-European society.  
On average, with the Spanish contributions and the European investment, Spain would 
receive 0.8% of its GDP to invest in its economy. However, the EU did specify on what Spain 
had to invest the funding but lacked to identify on how it must be spend. Due to the complicated 
Graph 9. GRP per capita per region ’79-’86. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008), INE (1988), and 
Carreras (2005) 
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construction of the Spanish State and its autonomous communities, it was the responsibility of 
the communities to reach the objectives that were created by the central government and the 
EU.  
The accession of Spain into the EU was seen as one of the greatest achievements of current 
Spain, and the political party at the time received many admiration among the Spaniards. The 
winner of the general elections, halfway into 1986 the PSOE gained another majority in 
Parliament by securing 164 seats. The AP and the CDS would follow up with respectively 126 
seats, whereas the remainder seats were majorly distributed among regional parties. 
Although the successes of the PSOE in their first term in Parliament, the second term became 
more challenging, since the topics with which the PSOE won its first election were not yet 
resolved. The inflation and unemployment remained high, the infrastructure was still behind 
the desired State and the industrial and agriculture sectors were not developing sufficiently. 
Due to the new cash flow from the EU, many regions were demanding extra funding of the 
central government in order to achieve their objective (Guillén, Álvarez & Silva, 2003: 243). 
The PSOE did indeed increased the funding, but also secured that it maintained – nationally 
and hopefully regional – its economic policies of their first term in Parliament, thus controlling 
wages and wage costs, and increasing job flexibility (PSOE, 1986).  
6.3.1 Andalusia 
After winning the first regional election of Andalusia in 1982, the PSOE failed to reach their 
objectives that were set at the beginning of 1984. The unemployment continued to grow and 
reach at the end of 1987 a new time high rate of 29.2%, whereas the GRP per capita was more 
than 21% beneath the national average (Table 22). Therefore, the PSOE gathered again a 
committee to analyse the economic situation of Andalusia, and set new objectives and strategies 
aligned with their policies set in their electoral programme. 
Albeit the plan was created with the same intentions, the construction differed significantly. 
The previous plan approached the problem quite broad and superficial, whereas this plan 
approaches the problems individually and specifically.  
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The plan established three new main objectives that needed to be reach within the term 1987-
1990; the first objective remained the same as the previous plan, the creation of employment. 
The plan indicated that the myriad of unemployment was among young adults in the region, 
therefore this objective was mainly targeted at the young population of the region with the 
underlying thought of investing in human capital (Junta de Andalucia, 1987: 97). The plan 
clearly differentiated itself compared with the previous plan that indicated to achieve a higher 
activity rate and a lower unemployment rate through a competitive marketing with no external 
aid. This time, the plan relied on subsidies and strict wage control to manipulate the market into 
hiring more young professional, whereas the wage gap amidst different age-categories would 
be limited as much as possible (Ibid, 1987: 100-104). 
Second main objective is part of the party’s development policies and is directly linked with 
the previous objective. This objective wanted to increase personal incomes and greater 
integration of the productive system. In order to improve the region’s social welfare, the 
increase of income was evident to generate a surplus in households’ capability to increase their 
saving and investments, which in turn - according to the plan - increased the job market (Junta 
de Andalucia, 1987: 98). The approach to achieve this objective was similar as the previous 
objective; maintaining a strict wage control in order to correctly distribute wages accordingly 
and with extra help in the shape of subsidies.  
The last objective is the improvement of the quality of life with an equitable social and 
territorial distribution. The PSOE indicated that the quality of life could be in a materialistic 
and a non-materialistic way. The former would be done through improving the infrastructure 
of the region, since a better infrastructure would accelerate the development of the economic 
market as well as the social market. The non-materialistic approach to improve the quality of 
Table 22. Economic Data Andalusia ’87-’93. Based on database BDMORES (2008) & INE (1987-1993) 
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life, was an equal distribution of wealth and territory. The plan indicated that investment would 
be made to set up regional institutions that monitored and distributed social welfare equally 
among the citizens of the region.  
At the end of 1990 and the beginning of the elections, the PSOE again did not obtained it 
objectives. Nevertheless, there was still a slight economic growth in the region - although the 
gap with the national average got wider - and there was a minor decrease in the unemployment 
rate (Table 22). Albeit, the results did not match with the objectives set by the party, it was still 
good enough to win the consequent elections with yet again a majority of the seats; 62 of the 
109. The PSOE constructed a new economic plan, however this time with the same committee 
as the previous one (Junta de Andalucia, 1991). The plan did not contain new information 
regarding the main objectives nor the approaches to achieve them. The only big change that 
occurred between the two plans, was the reduction in the employment rate. This event led to a 
redistribution of the government funding which resulted in an increase in investments in social 
institutions (Ibid, 1991: 278). 
At the end, the PSOE did not have much economic successes. The repercussion of the oil 
crisis of 1979, was still felt until the late ‘80 with a high unemployment rate. The unemployment 
rate rose significantly in the years 1989-1991, reaching a new record of 30% at the end of 1993. 
Nonetheless, the region had a continuous economic growth, the GRP per capita increased with 
an average of 10% per year, yet the gap with the national average had become wider by 23%. 
Andalusia at this point, won the right to call itself the poorest region of Spain. Despite 
earning this name, it did not affect the Andalusians when it came to their sense of identity. The 
Andalusians remained proud to their region as well as their national origin (Table 23). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 23. Andalucian regionalism ’87-’93. Based on database Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1982b) 
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6.3.2 Comunitat Valenciana 
At the end of the first term of the PSPV, the region of Valencia was economically performing 
stable. The unemployment rate was dropping steadily and the economic growth was continuing. 
These developments played a critical role in the second regional election, securing another win 
for the PSPV. The PSPV manage to collect 42 of the seats within the Generalitat, but failed to 
obtain the majority. The decrease of votes, albeit surprisingly, could be mainly explained by 
the fact that the CDS participated this year with the regional elections.  
During the first general elections, the region of Valencia was a great supporter of UCD, and 
remained royal partial throughout the party's downfall. The new party of Adolfo Suárez 
obtained 10 seats in the election, whereas surprisingly the regional parties performed better by 
earning respectively; 6 votes - Union Valenciana (UV), and 6 votes - the United Left of the 
Valencian country (EUPV). In order to obtain the majority within the Generalitat, the PSPV 
formed a coalition with the United Left to become a majority with 48 seats. 
Looking at the Valencian sentiment towards their identity, the region remained having a 
strong sense of dual-identity, which could explain the sudden increase of votes for regional 
parties.  
 
The newly chosen Generalitat was satisfied with the developments of the previous 
implemented policies (CIS, 2015), since the construction sector was growing again and started 
to generate more GRP. Furthermore, due to the accession of Spain in the European Union, the 
PSPV saw opportunities to improve the regional image of Valencia on the European market. 
The PSPV reviewed the General plan it initiated in its first term in the Generalitat, and decided 
to increase the investments. Eventually the PSPV would increase its spending on infrastructure 
Table 24. Economic data Valencia ’87-’93. Based on database BDMORES (2008) & INE (1987-1993). 
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at the end of its second term by 326%, increasing it from 260 million to 705 million 
(BD.MORES, 2008). 
Additional effects of the accession of the EU, was the increase of trading opportunities with 
other EU-members. To initiate the competition with the region’s arch rival: Catalonia, the PSPV 
adjusted the General plan to redirect investments to the expansions and improvements of the 
regional ports and harbours (Membrado, 2013). The investments had a positive effect on the 
export of the ports, increasing the revenues from €7.5 million in 1986 to €13 million in 1990 
(Haba, 2004: 210). 
The economic successes in the region, played again in favour with the PSPV in the regional 
elections of 1991. The PSPV kept its position in the Generalitat, and obtained a sole majority 
by obtaining 45 seats. For a third consecutive term, the PSPV continued with its policies in its 
region. However, according to their electoral programme, economic growth became a less 
important point on the agenda, whereas now economic development gained the party’s 
preferences. Therefore, social policies came higher on the agenda, such as unemployment 
benefits, increased health care for workers, social protection, minimum protection, and reform 
of the educational system (PSOE, 1989).  
In Valencia, the PSPV continued with the General plan regarding the improvement of the 
infrastructure. However the PSPV, contradicting with its general election plans, reduced 
investments in the health care and reinvested it in the improvement of the quality of education 
and culture. Furthermore, the investments made in the infrastructure, started - as some of the 
PSOE members predicted - to affect the agriculture of the region, reaching an all-time low of 
containing just 3% of all the work active population (Appendix A2). Also the industry and 
construction sector started to lose ground, and in 1992 the unemployment rate started again to 
rise. The most probable cause, was the early 1990’s recession that was slowly moving towards 
Spain. 
It was also remarkable that around the time of financial and economic setbacks, an increase 
of Valencian inhabitants was observed that stated to have a more dual-identity (Table 25).    
 Table 25. Valencian regionalism ’87-’93. Based on Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1984) 
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6.3.3 Community of Madrid 
The community of Madrid maintained its economic growth during the first term of the PSOE 
in the Madrilenian Parliament (Asamblea). Although the PSOE did not made significant 
changes, the regional economy blossomed while engaging the competition with Catalonia and 
the Basque country to earn the title of the wealthiest region. The lack of changes may have 
played a part in the second regional election of 1987, where the PSOE lost its majority status 
in the Asamblea by obtain just 40 seats. Although, the opposition was the majority, with the AP 
and the CDS securing together 49 seats, the PSOE decide to continue as a minority.  
Since the community of Madrid had a good institutional structure combined with an 
economic strength, the PSOE decide to invest more into the community. In the first year of 
being selected, the PSOE invested 31.9% in restructuring the health-care system and in social 
policies (del Campo, 1999: 108).  To further improve the social status it continued to invest 
19.1% in the urbanization of the region, whereas 17.2% was invested in the region’s 
infrastructure. The high investment in healthcare was just a one-time event, because after 1987 
the PSOE, relocated the majority of the investments back to the development of the urban areas 
as well as the overall infrastructure of the region. (Ibid 1999: 108) (Appendix A3). 
The investments, excluding the investments in healthcare, had a direct effect on the 
economy. In the years 1987 until 1990, the industrial and the construction sector had a slight 
benefit of the new implemented policies, since the two sectors generated 30% in 1990 of the 
GRP compared with 28% in 1987. 
Furthermore, the unemployment started to decline, going from 18% to 10% in 1990. 
Unfortunately it did not help the economic growth; albeit it did not decline, it did however 
stagnate. Also, the gap with the national average did not widen, but slightly shrunk.  
However, the news of the recession in 1990 in Europe, and the slight increase in the 
unemployment rate, made the third regional elections of Madrid unpredictable. Eventually, the 
Partido Popular - created in January 1989 after a merger of the AP, PDP and the Liberal party 
- won the election by obtaining 47 seats but failed to get a majority in Parliament. 
The PP policies to increase the economic development of the community of Madrid, was to 
continue the investment in the infrastructure (PP, 1986). Furthermore, the PP wanted to invest 
in the sector that were generated the most GRP and hold the most employments. To fight the 
unemployment rate, however, it needed to invest in education to supply the opportunity to 
employees to be able to re-educate themselves (PP, 1987: 19). 
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The PP reduced the regional investment in the urbanization by more than 50%, investing 
only 12.2% of its budget compared with the 30.2% of the previous year. The extra investments 
were used to invest in; infrastructure, education, economy, and the improvement of financial 
and social institutions of the region (del Campo, 1999: 110). Unfortunately, even with the 
investments, the PP could not stabilize the unemployment rate or repel the effects of the 
approaching recession (Table 26). 
6.3.4 Castilla and León 
During the first term of the PSOE in the Castilian-Leonese Parliament, the party continued 
to struggle with the diversity within its party. The PSOE already did not hold a majority in the 
Parliament, and the continuous internal disagreement on where to allocate resources and 
investments led to dissatisfaction among Parliamentarians but also among the citizens (CIS, 
1998). With the second regional election in 1987, the PSOE suffered a rare loss by losing with 
a marginal difference from the AP. Although both parties received the same amount of seats, 
the AP received 0.35% more votes than the PSOE, yet could not form a majority. Nevertheless, 
together with the PDP and the UL, the AP entered its first term as a minority.  
The AP recognized the potential that the Spanish accession into the EU brought, and tried to 
stimulate the market to go international. The region was heavily relying on its industrial and 
agricultural sector, since both sectors provided 40% of the region’s GRP (Juste Carrión, 2012). 
Therefore, to prepare the market for export, the AP increased the investments in infrastructure 
by 25% of total spending, raising it to €310 million in 1987. Furthermore, 40% of the €310 
million was invested in the road network of the region.  Although the AP aimed to reduce 
governmental spending (PP, 1986), it found the investments necessary to pursue the free market 
Table 26. Economic data Madrid ’87-’93. Based on database BDMORES (2008) & INE (1987-1993). 
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it desired. In order to create more jobs, the AP hoped that the investments would stimulate the 
trading sector to expand, by conducting more national and international trade or by opening 
new factories in the region.   
The investments did had a positive effect, however not to the extent the AP hoped for. 
Unemployment rate dropped slightly, but it did not drop under the 10%, yet the region was well 
underneath the national average with a margin of roughly 5%. Furthermore, the agricultural 
sector shrunk rather than expanded, what was against the AP’s expectations, generating only 
8% of the region’s GRP (Bustos et al, 2008). Nonetheless, the return of investment started 
quickly to pay out, and at the end of the first term of the AP, the GRP per capita had grown by 
24.5%, averaging an annual growth of 6%, and shorten the gap to a 9% difference with the 
national average. Lastly, the strong rivalry between the Castilians and the Leonese had subdued 
significantly, whereas the regional parties lost most of their support, and more citizens were 
identifying themselves more as Spaniards instead of having a regional or a dual-identity (Table 
27).  
The third regional election in 1991 resulted in a consecutive win for the PP - since the AP 
merged into the PP in 1989 - by winning the majority of seats (43) in the Castilian-Leonese 
Table 27. Castilian-Leonese Regionalism. Based on Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1992b). 
Table 28. Economic Data Castilla & León ’87-’93. Based on database BDMORES (2008) & INE (1987-1993) 
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Parliament. The PSOE remained in pursuit with 35 seats, while the CDS received a massive 
blow after losing 13 seats and occupying just 5 seats. 
However, even after a victory in the regional election, the second term of the PP did not 
started out easily. The recession started in Spain, which meant that export dropped and regional 
economic growth stagnated. Furthermore, unemployment rate started to increase again on a 
national and regional level, and to make matters worse, the agricultural sector experienced one 
of the worst harvest in recent years, generating solely 5% of GRP in 1992 (Vallejo Pascual, 
2014: 18) (Appendix A4). The PP preferred to observe the developments of the recession, 
however was confronted with the fact that big infrastructural projects, such as the improvement 
of the railways system or the preparation for the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona, have been 
effective to control inflation rate. Therefore, against the party’s principle, the PP increased their 
expenditure in 1991 to 5% of its GRP, mostly investing in the expansion of the railway and 
roadway systems (Bustos et al, 2008) with the hope of reducing the damage that the recession 
would bring. 
6.3.5 Castilla-La Mancha 
In the regional election of 1987 in Castilla-La Mancha, the PSOE was re-elected to lead the 
community of Castilla-La Mancha a second term. The PSOE received the trust of 46% of the 
voters after a reasonable successful first term; whereas the AP and the CDS followed with 18 
and 4 seats in Parliament.  
The goal of the PSOE in its first term was to expand the social institutions in the region, and 
rapidly improve the educational system by establishing higher education institutions. Those 
goals did not change during the second term of PSOE, whereas the PSOE continued to invest 
in education. The amount of investments made in social institutions, however, remained equal, 
circulating around the €20 million (Bustos et al, 2008).  
The central policies of the PSOE of 1986 that indicated that governmental spending is 
required to provide social benefits and is necessary to maintain a healthy and stable market, 
were elongated to the regional level in the case of Castilla-La Mancha. The PSOE increased the 
amount of investments and started to increase its investment in infrastructure; for example, the 
spending on the road network almost doubled from 1986 to 1987, going from €94 million to 
€160 million. 
The problem of depopulation still continued within the region, however the PSOE ignored 
the question directly. The PSOE kept increasing spending to create more job opportunities, 
most likely acting under the motto; “if there are jobs then the people will come eventually 
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(Bono, 2015)”. Therefore the trend of urbanization in the first term was stopped, and the rural 
territories that remained was used for agriculture (Tabasco; Sánchez-Mateos & Rey, 2013). 
Furthermore, Castilla-La Mancha was one of the two regions - after Extremadura - that 
drastically increased spending in hydraulics, a total increase of 55% from 1986 to 1987. Last 
dramatic change in the spending pattern of the PSOE was the sudden investment in the 
construction of a railway network, investing €1.5 million in 1987 to investing €44 million as of 
1988. All these changes indicated that the PSOE was focused on the preservation of the region’s 
industrial and agricultural sector (Bustos et al, 2008). 
The increased spending was seen as great success by the PSOE, since in 1990 the region 
experienced one of their golden year with a boost in their GRP, going from €10 billion to €12 
billion, whereas the unemployment rate dropped from 14% to 11% (Table 29). However, there 
was criticism of the opposition, warning the PSOE that when economic difficulties would arrive 
that the region would have trouble to continue to finance all the expansion that have been made 
(Martinez, 2011: 15). However, the PSOE and the public discarded the critique toward the next 
regional election. 
 
The economic successes did satisfied the inhabitants of Castilla-La Mancha, but the region 
was still heavily divided regarding their identity. Although the dual-identity slowly increased 
alongside the economic growth of the community, there was as well a strong sense of 
nationalism evolving in the region (Table 30). Nevertheless, this did not seem to result in any 
conflicts or changes in political preferences.    
Before the regional elections of 1991, the PSOE had a wide lead of the opposition in the 
polls. The economic successes, although still remaining underneath the national average, 
Table 29. Economic Data Castilla-La Mancha ’87-’93. Based on database BDMORES (2008) & INE (1987-1993). 
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increased the support for the PSOE. Therefore, with the regional elections of 1991, the PSOE 
strengthened its majority in the Castilian-Manchegan election by gaining 27 of the seats.  
However, all of the parties observed the incoming recession and argued heavily on how to 
protect the economy of the region. Nevertheless, the PSOE continued to invest in the region’s 
infrastructure, yet did not - even after the successful years of 1989 and 1990 - increase its 
expenditure.       
6.3.6 Cross-case Regional Comparison 1987-1993 
Andalusia versus Castilla and León. 
The economic recuperation of the oil crisis of 1979 developed differently among the two 
communities. The PSOE had won the regional elections in both regions, yet decided to adopt 
different strategies and implemented different policies to accomplish the central objectives and 
conform to the central strategies. Nevertheless, the communities experienced a low economic 
growth rate, whereas the unemployment rate remained high. Therefore, the biggest change 
amidst the duo was the change of the political party in the second regional election; whereas 
Castilla and León chose the People 
Coalition as their new 
representative, Andalusia expressed 
continuous trust in the PSOE. 
Albeit both parties had their 
main priority to reduce 
unemployment, the PSOE trusted in 
its previous strategy of increasing 
governmental spending. The PSOE 
started investing in education, unemployment benefits, subsidies, and financial institutions to 
increase the activity rate - mainly among young adults - and provide a more equal distribution 
of wealth and standard of living. The PSOE invested in the period 1987 - 1993, ± €15 billion in 
Table 31. Expenditure comparison Andalusia-Castilla & León. Based on 
database BDMORES (2008) 
Table 30. Castilla-Manchegan regionalism ’87-’93. Based on database Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1992ª) 
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Andalusia, of which 62% in infrastructure, 4% in health care, 8% in education, and the 
remaining in social institutions. 
The AP, normally opposed of governmental spending, implemented the policy of investing 
for the future. By temporarily reducing the unemployment rate by creating jobs in construction 
sector to improve the infrastructure, it hoped to stimulate the market. Therefore, Castilla and 
León invested € 6.5 billion of which it dedicated 58% to infrastructure, 8% in education, and 
5% in healthcare, whereas the remaining budget would be invested in subsidies and other tools 
to stimulate the markets. 
The efficiency of the strategies seemed to be in favour of the AP, since Castilla and León 
had a small decrease in its unemployment rate and it lessened the difference with the national 
average of the GRP per capita. However, the changes were marginal since Andalusia also 
experience economic growth but could not match the national average, and the unemployment 
rate in Andalusia fluctuated yet remained high. 
 
Valencia versus Castilla-La Mancha 
The Valencian Generalitat managed to repel the effects of the oil crisis of 1979 and, 
compared to the other cases, experienced a great growth in its GRP per capita between 1982 
until 1986. Castilla-La Mancha neither had rough times, but also did not experience exponential 
economic growth. It was due to these results that the PSOE and the PSPV were re-elected in 
the second regional elections. 
Although, the PSOE and the PSPV 
are closely related, the PSPV continued 
to express trust in its strategy and 
policies it implemented in its first term. 
Albeit,   it approach did not completely 
matched with the PSOE electoral 
programme, it did retained itself to the 
goal of spending only 5% of its GRP. 
Whereas the PSOE focused on equal distribution of expenditures on the economic sectors, the 
PSPV saw opportunities in the increasing tourism after the Spanish accession in the European 
Union. Therefore, the PSPV continued with its policies to drastically invest in the infrastructure 
to accommodate the tourism flow. Furthermore, the accession also meant a possible increase in 
international trade, thus the investments were also increased for the expansion of the local 
harbours and ports. A total of 54% of total expenditure, or € 4.5 billion, was invested in the 
Table 32. Expenditure comparison Valencia-Castilla-La Mancha. 
Based on database BDMORES (2008) 
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improvement of the harbours and infrastructure from 1987 until 1993. Whereas, 10% of total 
expenditure was spent on education and 5% on healthcare. 
The PSOE in Castilla-La Mancha remained more aligned with the PSOE central policies 
instead of creating more region-specific strategies or policies. The PSOE started in Castilla-La 
Mancha to invest infrastructure to create job opportunities. However, to be more precise, 
majority of the infrastructure expenditure was allocated to hydraulics in order to improve the 
agriculture and industry of the city. In a period of six years, the PSOE spent a total of €3.1 
billion on infrastructure, which totals to 70% of its six year expenditure. 6% was spent on 
education, whereas surprisingly 4% on healthcare. 
The period was accompanied by economic growth for both regions, whereas 1989 and 1990 
were considered the most successful years of Castilla-La Mancha. With an average growth rate 
of 10% per year and an average unemployment rate of 13%, the time period of 1987 until 1993 
was considered as one of the most prosperous. Nevertheless, Valencia also experienced a steady 
growth of averaging 9% a year and remaining on level with the national average. It could not 
however, reduce its unemployment steadily, which continued to fluctuate throughout the six 
years. 
 
Shadow case Madrid 1987-1993 
In the second term of the PSOE, it started to act more according to its central policies by 
investing more in the region of Madrid. Around 4% of the GRP was allocated to new 
investments of the region, investing a total of €5.7 billion. Maintaining a stable investment 
percentage in education and healthcare - 11% and 6% - and in its infrastructure of 28%. 
Furthermore, it continued to maintain the wage controls and equal distribution of wealth and 
employment among sectors. 
It resulted in the unemployment rate to decrease in the second term of the PSOE, but the 
economic growth did the same. Furthermore, another phenomenon occurred; the dual-identity 
within the region started to increase, whereas the trust of the PSOE started to decrease due to 
the lack of changes in the regions (CIS, 1992d).  
In the next following regional elections, the PP substituted the PSOE as a majority in the 
Madrilenian Asemblea. Strangely, the PP also contradicted with its central policies and opted 
for more investments in the regions. However, it did stick to the ideology that the region should 
follow the concept of a free market. Therefore, to stimulate the market to becoming more 
independent, the PP invested more money in the subsidies and other tools that could stimulate 
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the market. Lastly, it dropped the policy of making the economic sectors equal and focused on 
the most successful sector in order to make the region more specialized.  
The unemployment rate continued to decrease - 10% in 1993, whereas the economic growth 
would not increase nor decrease until 1994. The 1990 recession was slowly making way 
through Spain, therefore another motivation for the PP to continue the increased investments. 
Although the economic growth stagnated, the region remained more economically developed 
and wealthy compared with the other regions (Graph 10). 
 
Graph 10. GRP per capita per region ’87-’93. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008), INE (1987-1993), and 
Carreras (2005) 
6.4 The Economic Growth 1994-2008 
The period of economic growth did not start conveniently for Spain. After Black Monday, 
the 19th of October 1987, the day when the worldwide stock markets received a huge blow after 
an economic meltdown in Hong-Kong, an economic recession approach the European market. 
Due to a combination of overvaluation, illiquidity, inadequate program trading, and simple 
human psychology, led to that the economic markets of the United States of America, Japan, 
Australia, the United Kingdom and New-Zealand dealt with huge deficits (Blanchard, 1993). 
The ongoing conflicts between US-troops and Iran & Iraq forces in the Middle-East did not 
soothe the tensions on the markets. 
Although the stock market recovered quickly from the blow, the economy of the 
aforementioned nations started to decline, whereas their currencies started to devaluate. Slowly 
but certainly, this started to affect the European Union and its member States as well. In 1993, 
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Spain - although as one of the last member States - finally felt the consequences of Black 
Monday, unable to hold off an economic decline. The late reaction was due to the huge 
infrastructure projects that were on-going in the early 90’s as well as the Olympic Games held 
in 1992 that controlled the country’s inflation rate (Camacho, 2009). In 1993, the national 
unemployment rate reached 20.5%, whereas the Spanish GDP declined by 1.1%.  
The Spaniards and its politicians did saw the recession coming, therefore putting the topic 
high on the political agenda and their electoral programmes. The PSOE promised its voters, it 
would secure jobs, reduce the public deficit, fight inflation, and keep the public investment on 
5% of its GDP to secure social and economic benefits. (PSOE, 1993). 
The PP accused the Socialist of purposely lowering aggregate demand with high 
governmental spending, resulting that products and services would be cheaper but that it was 
the reason that employment dropped (PP, 1992). Furthermore, the PP predicted that harsh 
economic times would follow that could not be avoided, however the Spanish recovery could 
be rapid according to the economic policies of the PP. The PP argued that increasing 
competitiveness, decreasing public spending, and investing directly in the industrial sector - 
such as privatizing rehabilitated industrial companies - should reinitiate the Spanish market to 
overcome these economic setbacks (Ibid, 1992). 
With the 1993 General Elections, the PP did won more voters compared with the previous 
election, but could not obtain more seat than the PSOE. With 159 votes, the PSOE continued 
its winning streak and together with the Catalonian Convergence Union and the Basque 
Nationalist Party, it also formed a majority. The PSOE did not hold back with it election 
promises and immediately started to increase government spending, but could not realize the 
5% of GDP. The spending did not had the direct effects that the PSOE was hoping for. Albeit 
the economy started to grow again, obtaining the party’s main objective; fighting the 
unemployment rate, failed. The unemployment rate did grow in 1994 to 22%, and would not 
surpass it, it would remain circulating around the 20% for the next three years. Furthermore, 
the PSOE also could not fulfil its target to invest 5% of GRP on public spending. The predicted 
economic growth of the PSOE was too marginal to realize a 5% spending, therefore the PSOE 
never spent more than 3.5% from 1993 until 1996. 
The 1996 general election broke the chain of consecutive wins for the PSOE, with the PP 
winning with 156 seats in Parliament. Unfortunately, the party fell 20 seats too short for an 
absolute majority. The PP wanted during its first term to suppress the nationalism in the Basque 
country and Catalonia, and did not favour the nationalist parties such as; Convergència I Unió, 
Partido Nacionalist Vasco and the Coalición Canaria. However in order to become a majority, 
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the PP had to collaborate with the aforementioned parties. Nevertheless, the PP agreed with the 
coalition to fight inflation and unemployment, however adopted another approach than the 
PSOE. The PP wanted to increase exportation of Spanish products and services; therefore to 
stimulate the market to do so, the party would create subsidies (PP, 1996: 21). Furthermore, the 
PP reckoned that the local economy was outdated, thus indicated that the public spending 
should be more focused on the modernization of the industrial and construction sector (PP, 
1996: 58). The latter was according to the PP the sector with the most opportunities to develop 
and create more jobs. Lastly, for the market to develop further, the PP argued that more 
businesses had be created. Therefore, the last economic policy of the PP was to reduce non-
salary cost for businesses in order to stimulate the creation of new enterprises (PP, 1996: 19).  
The economy of Spain thrived after the recession of 1993, with the unemployment rate 
dropping from 20% to 13% at the end of the PP’s first term in Parliament. Furthermore, the 
national GDP increased significantly during the first four years of the PP, with a total growth 
of 24, 8%, averaging a growth of 6.2% per year.  
The economic successes rewarded the PP with a second term in the central Parliament, after 
another win in the general election of 2000. By securing 150 seats and continuing the successful 
coalition with the nationalist parties of Catalonia and the Basque Country, the PP continued its 
policies until 2004. It promised in its electoral programme to distribute the economic gains 
equally among the Spanish regions, whereas it also advocated for the reduction of taxes, 
especially the VAT (PP, 2000: 31) Furthermore, the PP wanted to increase spending into the 
education system, to increase the chances for young citizens to find employment while 
simultaneously increase the quality of the Spanish market. 
After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in the United States of America, 2001, 
the PP had to redistribute its governmental spending towards national security. Furthermore, 
Spain as a member of the NATO had to prepare for the invasion of Iraq, which Prime-Minister 
Aznar agreed to even though it experienced much domestic opposition. These investments were 
costly, and although the Spanish economy was still growing and the unemployment rate still 
decreasing, the PP started to lose the trust of its voters.  
The 11 March 2004 bombings in Madrid, meant the downfall of the PP in the 2004 General 
elections. The bombing of Madrid was surrounded by much controversy, since the perpetrators 
of the bombings were soon identified by the PP as Basques terrorist of the terrorist group; ETA 
(El País, 2004). However, further investigations indicated that the bombing was conducted by 
the terrorist group Al-Qaeda. The PSOE accused the PP for falsely accusing the Basque Country 
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and purposely holding back information in order to support the war in Iraq. The PP lost 35 seats 
in Parliament, which led to the victory of the PSOE that gained a total of 164 seats.  
6.4.1 Andalusia 
The recession of 1993 left Andalusia in a poor position, with its unemployment rate up to 
30% and the GRP per capita being 23% underneath national average. Nevertheless, the PSOE 
expressed its full confidence in the economic plan that was constructed to the year 1994, stating 
that recession was caused by exogenous influences and Andalusia was strong enough to 
overcome it (Parlamento de Andalucía, 2012). Furthermore, the plan of 1991 was more focused 
on the cultural development of Andalusia and increasing the quality of life instead of economic 
growth. However, the great economic setbacks forced Andalusia, to adopt a different approach. 
Still, the majority of the Andalusians kept their trust in the PSOE and even though the PSOE 
lost 17 seats, it was still the winner of the 1994 regional elections with 45 seats. To obtain a 
majority, it created a coalition with the Andalusian Green party, which experienced its first 
biggest win in the regional election. 
The repercussions of the economic recession, put the region at a point similar at the 
beginning of 1991. Therefore, the PSOE decided not to construct a new economic plan, and 
expressed more trust towards the central policies of the PSOE and the old economic plan of 
1991. Also, the previous economic plan anticipated many European influences coming to 
Andalusia, which were postponed due to the recession (Franganillo, 2006: 43). Thus, Andalusia 
further developed the quality of its tourism sector and continued to allocate spending to the 
construction sector in order to build accommodations to facilitate the increased tourism flow. 
The lack of concrete plans, combined with a minority position in Parliament resulted that 
much of the PSOE policies did not pass legislation. Although the PSOE tried to form a coalition 
with the Green party, the economic and social perspectives between the two parties differed too 
much (Adarve, 1994: 3-4). These developments eventual led to the motion of no-confidence 
initiated by the opposition that needed to obtain 55 votes, thus the majority of Parliament, to 
dissolve the current Parliament. Before the motion of no-confidence could pass, the President 
Manuel Chaves opted for the dissolving of the Parliament and organized the regional election 
in 1996 (Benítez Salazar, 1998: 372). 
The regional election led to another win of the PSOE, although yet again failing to obtain an 
absolute majority. This time the PSOE, recognizing the slightly increased regionalism in the 
region, created a coalition with the Andalusian Party. The first step undertaken by the coalition 
was developing a new economic plan, and in 1998 the Parliament introduced the new economic 
76 | P a g e  P.A. Master Thesis - Richard Venhof 
 
plan; the horizon 2000. This plan’s purpose was to prepare the region of Andalusia for the 
transition into the new millennium and develop a stronger economic market. 
Whereas the previous plans had multiple objectives, this plan reduced the objective to one 
main objective; the economic and social development favourable for the employee-generation 
(Junta de Andalucía, 1998). 
Similar to the previous plan, the 2000 plan focused on the development of the regional 
tourism and agricultural sector; albeit the plan also indicated diversity within the productivity 
of Andalusia, thus including the other sectors as well. To indicate how the Andalusian 
Parliament was going to achieve the main objective, it compared Andalusia with other countries 
and how these countries approached similar obstacles to justify the Andalusian approaches. 
The plan described the following strategies; (i) the region had to develop its solidarity, thus 
an increased spending on maintaining the cultural heritage of Andalusia. (Junta de Andalucía, 
1998: 123) (ii) The development of equality was necessary to improve the quality of life amidst 
the Andalusians; by increasing taxes for higher incomes, the maintenance of the strict wage 
controls, and improve social institutions, the Parliament believed the overall spending would 
increase (Ibid, 1998: 125). (iii) A sustainable development. Although economic growth is 
essential, it should not go at the cost of the natural environment which could affect the 
preservation of the historic and cultural heritage of the region (Ibid 1998: 127). Furthermore, 
(iv) the plan indicated that government spending should be to provide diversity in the 
productivity sectors to initiate competition, whereas (v) spending must also be allocated to 
gather international recognition. 
Andalusia managed to reduce the unemployment rate to an all-time low of 12% at the 
beginning of 2008. Furthermore, the region underwent a positive economic growth, growing at 
average 4% per year. However, the economic growth did not came automatically, whereas the 
region of Andalusia was the region with the highest governmental expenditure. From 1994 until 
2008, the region of Andalusia had a total expenditure of €58 billion, spending on average €3.9 
billion per year, of which approximately 49% was spent on the improvement of the 
infrastructure amidst the Andalusian provinces, whereas 8% was spent on education, and 4% 
was invested in the improvement of the healthcare system. Albeit the GRP per capita of 
Andalusia was the highest it ever been with €18,500 per capita, it was still 21% underneath the 
Spanish average (Appendix B1). The PSOE furthermore followed its ideology by trying to 
develop each economic sector equally, in which they proved to be quite successful. Albeit the 
increasing tourism increased jobs opportunity, it was inevitable that the service sector increased 
the most. However, the industrial and construction sector maintained a constant growth rate. 
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6.4.2. Comunitat Valenciana 
Despite the strong economic position of the community of Valencia, it was not capable to 
fend off most of the recession’s effects in 1993. The community saw its unemployment rate rise 
to 23%, a rate it never experienced before since the Spanish transition into democracy. 
Furthermore, it saw its economic growth stagnate, and its GRP generated in the service and 
agricultural sector decline, to the dissatisfaction to the Valencian inhabitants (CIS, 2012). 
Therefore, at the 1995 regional elections, the PSOE lost for the first time in Valencia, since the 
return of the autonomous status by losing 13 seats. The PP took the opportunity to grasp the 
win by securing 42 seats in Parliament. However, it just fell short for an absolute majority, thus 
it formed a coalition with a former ally with whom they previously shared a ticket with in the 
1983; the Valencian Union (UV). 
The first undertaking of the coalition was to find out, where significant shortcomings were 
in the region economic and social policies. The PSOE had followed up on its central policies 
which meant increased government spending. Although, the investments made by the PSOE, 
especially in the infrastructure, were not inadequate, they were too much focused on the 
development of the industrial sector. The infrastructure - e.g. the hydraulics - in rural areas were 
too outdated, and were in dire need of modernization. Furthermore, the technology in the 
agricultural sector was not up-to-date and needed to be changed by newer versions, to speed up 
production (Generalitat Valenciana, 1999: 118). 
The next focus was on the industrial sector. Albeit the industrial sector performed well under 
economic difficulties, the coalition believed that the industrial sector had to invest more in 
sustainable energy. Therefore, the Parliament considered to invest in subsidies to motivate the 
sector to switch to sustainable energy (Ibid, 1999: 126).  
Lastly was the service sector, the coalition already stated in their electoral programme that 
this sector needed the most attention after the Spanish accession in the European Union. The 
PSOE already allocated investment towards the tourism sector in Valencia, to accommodate 
the increasing flow. However, the coalition discovered that the destination of the investments 
were opaquely indicated, therefore previous investments were retracted and relocated more 
precisely.  
The plan concluded with the following policies that the new coalition were going to 
implement; (i) Develop the competitiveness within the market by introducing subsidies for 
corporations and businesses to export and/or use sustainable energy, whereas lowering the non-
salary costs of businesses (Generalitat Valenciana, 1998: 238). (ii) Improvement of the 
78 | P a g e  P.A. Master Thesis - Richard Venhof 
 
telecommunication and medias in Valencia; technology has the future, therefore the community 
of Valencia has to be up-to-date (Ibid, 1998: 239). (iii) The introduction of sustainable energy 
and the updating of the regional hydraulics system, to strengthen the industrial and agricultural 
sector. (iv) Improve the urban infrastructure as well as the tourist infrastructure to provide better 
service to the tourism flow.  
Economically the community of Valencia performed accordingly, recovering fast from the 
recession and kept close to the national average. At the end of 2008, the community had 
invested more than €33 billion of which 43% went to the improvement of the infrastructure, 
whereas 42% went to subsidies, and other investments. The remaining 15% was divided in 8% 
for education and 7% for healthcare. This led to a decrease in the unemployment rate from 23% 
to 8%, and to an annual average growth of 4%. Lastly, the GRP per capita of the community of 
Valencia raised from €10,000 per capita in 1994 to €21,000 in 2008, keeping up with the 
national average growth rate (Appendix B2). 
6.4.3 Community of Madrid  
The recession of 1993 was also felt in the community of Madrid, resulting in an increase of 
unemployment rate and the stagnation in the GRP growth. The PP looked anxiously at the 1995 
Madrilenian elections, with the uncertainty on how the newest economic setbacks would affect 
their position. The PP however did incorporated in their electoral programme that the recession 
was inevitable and that the party would take precautions to facilitate a quicker recovery (PP, 
1992).  
In 1995 when the recession was at its top, the Madrilenian elections announced the PP as the 
winner of the elections acquiring 54 seats, securing an absolute majority. The PSOE and the 
Left Party were the only two parties able to secure the remaining seats, 32 and 17 respectively.  
With the victory the PP could continue with its policies, previously implemented. However, 
due to the recession, the new policy of the party was adapted to cut governmental spending and 
to increase the market’s competitiveness (PP, 1992). Therefore in the first year of being re-
elected, even with the repercussions of the recession, the PP reduced the governmental 
expenditures on all fronts by a total of 11% compared with the previous year, and started to 
invest 37% of its budget in infrastructure, whereas the remaining 63% would go into education, 
health care, subsidies, and economic institution to better guide the market and to stimulate it to 
adopt a more international approach (Bustos et al, 2008). 
The first two years were rough and slow, with the unemployment rate remaining at 16% and 
the economic growth growing by 4%. Nevertheless in 1997, improvements were reported; the 
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unemployment rate started to drop whereas the economic growth in the sectors as well as the 
overall growth of GRP per capita started to increase. The growth continued until the next 
Madrilenian election in 1999, giving the PP a good position with the unemployment rate being 
dropped to 10% and a continuous economic growth of around 5%. Furthermore, the PP 
promised in its election programme, to prepare Madrid for the 21st century and equally 
distribute the economic wealth that was gained the past term (PP, 1996). 
With the Madrilenian election of 1999, the PP strengthened its position as an absolute 
majority, by receiving 1 extra seat in Parliament, enabling the PP to introduce its new plan. The 
PP would stick to the central 3% expenditure of its GRP per year to continue the competition 
with the regions: Catalonia and Basque Country. The PP recognized that investments in four 
interlinked components were needed in order to further develop the region, and prepare it for 
any future recessions; market structure, public administration, infrastructure, and environment 
(Buesa, 2001: 3). 
To improve the market structure, the PP would first increase spending on market research 
and development, conducted by universities and institution. A better understanding of the 
market structure led that the government can allocate subsidies better and more sufficiently 
(Ibid, 2001: 7). Furthermore, the continuation of motivating corporations to participate in 
international trade was essential, thus the incentives for corporations had to improve. Also, the 
PP also wanted to get rid of the old PSOE policy of equal sectoral distribution and focus more 
on the specialization of the sectors. 
However, to improve the market structure, again the infrastructure was still not up to the 
standards that it could endure increased trade (international or national). Furthermore, the PP 
predicted an increase in the sectors, and therefore an increase in jobs, thus pointed out that the 
region should further urbanize. Lastly, to facilitate the growing and evolving market, the PP 
claimed that new investments must be made in technology. Therefore, the PP agreed to 
continuous invest in the infrastructure (Ibid, 2001:61). 
To administer all the new developments and changes in the regions, the PP argued that the 
public administration must be modernized and improved. The PP advocated public 
transparency, and therefore urged the administration of Madrid to do the same. By embracing 
the technology era, public institutions needed investments to digitalize all information and data, 
and improve its internal system to become more effective and efficient (Ibid, 2001: 62). 
The PP would stay in Parliament as a majority to at least 2008. In that time period, the party 
stuck to its policy of maintaining a government expenditure of just 3% of its GRP. The 
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aforementioned components were until 2008 continuous financed, spending on average 18% 
on infrastructure, and 71% on the other aforementioned components.  
From 2000 until 2008 the Madrilenian market flourished, with the unemployment rate at 6% 
at the beginning of 2008, and its GRP per capita; €30.800 (Appendix B3). It therefore remained 
one of the wealthiest regions of Spain, continuously remaining far above the nation’s 
average.       
6.4.4 Castilla and León  
Although, the PP prepared the region of Castilla and León for the up-marching recession, it 
did not give the party the certainty it would win the Castilian-Leonese election of 1995. 
However, the voters of the PP kept their trust and the PP won the 1995 elections, whereas it 
actually strengthened its position by acquiring an additional 7 seats. The opposition existed out 
of the PSOE, which lost 7 seats, the Left Party (IU), and the Leonese People’s Union (UPL) 
together occupying 34 seats. 
The recession was still present – albeit subduing – in the first year of the PP’s second term. 
Nevertheless, the PP analysed that the increasing expenditure prior of the recession, did not had 
the wished effects that the party expected. Therefore, the PP went back to its central policies, 
and limited its expenditure to 3% of the region’s GRP. Furthermore, the PP rearranged its 
political agenda to change its priority from stability to economic growth and the creation of 
employment. 
Although the PP was in favour of specializing the region with the sector that was most 
beneficial, however due to the great diversity in the sectors of Castilla and León the PP decided 
to divide its expenditure accordingly (Junta de Castilla y León, 2000: 530). To increase the 
employment rate and assist economic growth, the PP created objectives that it hoped to achieve 
at the end of 2006. The objectives were divided into three categories closely linked to one 
another; the increase of economic growth, create job opportunities, and development of the 
agricultural sector (Ibid, 2000). 
To increase economic growth, the Parliament had to participate with the ongoing 
competition among regions to attract tourism. After the accession of the EU, a continuous 
increase of international tourists crossed the Spanish border annually (Gonzalez & Moral, 
1995). Therefore, the Parliament had to first valuate the endogenous potential of the region, 
whereas afterwards it could invest in touristic attractions and legislation accordingly. 
Furthermore, to facilitate this stream of tourists better, the majority of the expenditure had to 
be invested again in the infrastructure, especially in the roadway systems. 
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To create employment, the Parliament initiated programs to re-educate unemployed, 
whereas it would subsidize the businesses that were willing to participate in these programs 
(Ibid, 2000). Moreover, the globalization created more opportunities for international trade, 
thus corporations should avert their attention from solely the national market and consider the 
international market as well. Therefore, the Parliament developed subsidies as incentives for 
corporations that wanted to enter the international or European market (PP, 2000). Since, a lot 
of potential laid in the agricultural sector as well as the industrial sector of the region, the 
Parliament focused mainly its attention on these two sectors. Therefore, investments would be 
made for the preservation of rural areas, better hydraulics and roadway to aid production, and 
better technology. 
From 1995, economic prosperity would follow the region Castilla and León. The region 
would double its GRP over a period of 10 years, with an average annual growth of 4%, whereas 
the unemployment rate would go from 19% in 1994 to 8% in 2008. The GRP per capita would 
also double in a 10 year period, reaching eventually €22,000 per capita, staying around 5% 
below national average (Appendix B4). These economic successes were accompanied by heavy 
investments. At the beginning of 2008, Castilla and León had invested a total of €29.5 billion, 
of which 48% was dedicated to the improvement of the infrastructure and hydraulics, 4% was 
invested in the improvement of quality of the education system as well as healthcare. The 
remaining 42% was invested in subsidies and other market tools to stimulate the free market to 
expand and develop. 
Nevertheless, these achievements were sufficient for the PP to maintain a consecutive wins 
throughout the period 1995 to the election of 2007, maintaining an absolute majority. Still the 
Leonese political parties continue to participate in the regional election, fighting for their 
autonomous status. However, due to the economic developments, and the national recognition 
of the nation, a shift among the identities of the Castilian-Leonese inhabitants was measured 
towards a sole Spanish identity. 
6.4.5 Castilla-La Mancha 
The PSOE already warned the region in 1991 that economic dark times were approaching, 
referring to the economic recession, yet stated that the successes of 1990 were no coincident. 
The region suffered economic losses just as any other community, resulting in an increase of 
unemployment rate and a decrease in economic growth. Although some voters lost their trust 
in the PSOE, the party still won the 1995 Castilian-Manchegan election, securing an absolute 
majority by just 1 votes (24/47). 
82 | P a g e  P.A. Master Thesis - Richard Venhof 
 
Nevertheless, the recession taught the PSOE a harsh lesson, which seemed to have made the 
party wary with its expenditure. During the fourth consecutive term, the PSOE never exceeded 
the 4% barrier of its GRP when it came to expenditure. The central policy of spending 5% of a 
community’s GRP to increase the standard of life, was thus ignored by the PSOE in Castilla-
La Mancha. However, the region recovered sturdy and soon the unemployment rate started to 
decrease yet again. 
The development did not go unnoticed with the citizens of Castilla-La Mancha, and with the 
1999 regional elections, the PSOE extended its administration for a fifth term. With 26 seats, 
its only opposition had become the PP that secured the remaining 21 seats, whereas the Left 
party lost its only seat. The PSOE added considerable value to the victory, due to the fact that 
the PSOE was during this time, losing a lot of political ground across the autonomous 
communities. Therefore after the 1999 victory, the PSOE constructed a regional development 
plan after inspired by other communities; Valencia, Castilla and León, Aragon, Andalusia. 
The plan had three main objectives, which were divided by the policies and strategies needed 
to achieve the objectives, and the predicted results (Gobierno de Castilla-La Mancha, 1998).  
The first objective is the improvement of the region’s GRP. The ideology of the PSOE was 
diversity, an idea that the party wanted to prolong in the policies of the region. Therefore, it 
wanted to distribute its expenditure among all the sectors, whereas it would invest more in the 
“weaker” sector. Although the construction sector was considered the sector that generated the 
least GRP (Ibid, 1998: 671), the Castilian-Manchegan Parliament set its scope on the agriculture 
sector.  The Parliament would continue to spend less on the urbanization and more on the 
preservation of rural areas. Furthermore, the expenditure on infrastructure would increase, of 
which most would be allocated to the improvement of the road networks in rural areas, and 
creating incentives for agricultural businesses (Ibid, 1998: 744). 
The second objective was to achieve a lower unemployment rate. The PSOE ideology 
indicated that government expenditure was needed in order to create jobs, therefore increased 
spending in the aforementioned sections of infrastructure was necessary. Furthermore, the 
Parliament wanted to switch to more sustainable energy, thus investing in the appropriate 
technology. It is through these two objective that it eventually wanted to fulfil its last main goal; 
improving the quality of life.  
Analysing the time period of 1999 until 2008, the PSOE remained the absolute majority over 
another 2 elections. During this period, the PSOE implemented its plan and increased its 
expenditure. Over a period of fourteen years, the PSOE spent €15 billion on investments, 
averaging spending 4% of its GRP per year, of which 47% of the Castilian-Manchegan 
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spending was on infrastructure, whereas 9% on education, 7% on healthcare, and 37% on 
incentives for the market, improving social institutions, creation of social programs and the 
remaining necessary expenses (Bustos et al, 2008). 
Also the community of Castilla-La Mancha benefited from the economic prosperity that the 
nation of Spain was in. The region decreased its unemployment rate by 10%, going from 17% 
to 10%, whereas it doubled its GRP per capita going from €9.000 to €18.000 (Appendix B5).  
6.4.6 Cross-case Regional Comparison 1994-2008 
Andalusia versus Castilla and León 
The recession of 1993 was short but fierce that had direct effects on the two communities. 
The unemployment rate in Andalusia rose to a new record of 30%, whereas in Castilla and León 
it just remained underneath the 20% barrier. Nonetheless, for both Parliaments it was evident 
that new measures were needed to recover from this recession. 
The Andalusian plan of the 
future was focused on the cultural 
heritage of the region, improvement 
of the social institutions, and to 
better accommodate the increased 
tourism flow. To facilitate and 
finance these objectives, the PSOE 
in Andalusia remained with its 
strict wage controls and the policy 
of its 5% expenditure of GRP. The party, however, did increased income taxes for the higher 
income in order to distribute wealth equally.      
In Castilla and León, the PP had a different perspective and approach to recover from the 
recession. First, the PP was not in favour of increased expenditure in social benefits during 
financial difficulties, but opted for the Parliament to adopt a more supervisory role and stimulate 
the market where necessary. Therefore, to obtain their objectives of economic recovery and 
growth, the PP would invest in the product specialties of the region; agriculture and trade. 
Furthermore, the PP also wanted to participate in the competition to attain more tourists, thus 
investments also would be directed to the region’s infrastructure. 
In the period 1994 until 2008, the Andalusian expenditure was €58 billion, while the 
Castilian-Leonese expenditure was around €29.5 billion. Andalusia was in favour of social 
expenditure, therefore it invested 8% in education and 4% in the improvement of its healthcare 
Table 33. Expenditure comparison Andalusia - Castilla&León. Based on 
database BDMORES (2008) 
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system. However, 39% of its expenditure was spent for other investments including the 
improvement of its social institutions and programs. Castilla and León spent 4% of its 
expenditure on education and healthcare, whereas the remaining 42% was used for the 
remaining necessary investments including subsidies, improvement of financial institutions and 
social & economic programs.  
The expenditures, strategies and policies led to an economic growth for both communities. 
Both recorded an average annual growth of 4%, while reducing their unemployment rate to 
13% in Andalusia, and 7% in Castilla and León. However, the period of economic growth did 
not have significant influences on the identities of the two communities. The Andalusians 
maintained with 65% a strong dual identity, whereas the Castilian-Leonese kept fluctuating 
between the national identity and dual identity.   
 
Valencia versus Castilla-La Mancha 
The economic repercussions of the 1993 recession resulted in the last term of the PSPV in 
Valencia. The PP won the 1995 selection and started to change the region’s objectives, by 
starting to create strategies to recovery from the recession. However in Castilla-La Mancha, the 
inhabitants kept their trust in the PSOE that would stay intact until 2011. The PSOE considered 
the recession as a minor setback and was convinced that with its policies an automatic recovery 
would quickly follow. 
The Valencian PP advocated a competitive free market instead of the social-democratic 
structure of the PSOE. Therefore, to increase competition on the market, the Parliament reduced 
the policy of governmental spending to 3% instead of the previous 5%. Furthermore, the 
majority of the expenditure would be spent on incentives to stimulate the market, the 
improvement of technology, and infrastructure to maintain the growth of tourism in the region. 
Furthermore, it would limit government intervention in the market, whereas it would reduce 
non-salary costs for businesses to make the idea of entrepreneurship more interesting. 
The PSOE prolonged its objectives and ideas it had prior to the recession. It continued to 
promote diversity in the economy, meaning that each sector should be equally strong, whereas 
the main objective changed to a steady increase in the standard of living. By investing in the 
weaker economic sectors and creating incentives, the PSOE would create jobs as well as initiate 
growth. The party would spend more in infrastructure to facilitate the agriculture sector while 
simultaneously create job opportunity in the construction sector.   
From 1994 until 2008, Valencia invest a total of €33 billion, 3% of its GRP, of which 43% 
went to the improvement of infrastructure, 8% to education, 7% to healthcare, whereas the 
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remaining 42% went to incentives in forms of subsidies and other investment. Castilla-La 
Mancha had a total expenditure of €15 billion or 4% of its GRP, of which it invested 47% on 
its infrastructure, 9% on education, 7% on healthcare and 37% on the remaining investment 
including incentives and social programs. 
Both communities recovered quickly from the recession; the Valencian unemployment rate 
dropped from 23% to 10% within the first term of the PP, whereas the Castilian-Manchegan 
unemployment rate experienced a justifiable drop of 5%. Furthermore, Valencia was matching 
the national economic growth, generating in 2008 an average annual growth of 8.1% in its GRP 
per capita over a time period of 14 years. Castilla-La Mancha followed closely, matching a 
growth of an annual average of 7.95%, yet did not close nor widen the gap with the national 
average, whereas slowly distant itself from Valencia.  
In the 14 year period from 1994 until 2008, 
the economic growth was stable. This 
stability expressed no strong changes in the 
sentiment towards a certain identity in 
Valencia. The Valencian citizens maintained 
to have a strong dual identity fluctuating 
around 54% of its citizens. In Castilla-La 
Mancha, however, the economic stability and 
growth was accompanied by an increasing 
sentiment of dual-identity in the region. Whereas, the community was divided by national and 
dual-identity around 1994, in 2008 the sentiment of dual identity increased from 55% of the 
population towards 65% 
 
Shadow case Madrid 1994-2008 
Table 34. Expenditure comparison Valencia-Castilla-La Mancha. 
Based on database BDMORES (2008) 
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Although the recession did affect the economic situation of Madrid, the region still remained 
its economic growth and managed to hold its unemployment rate within reasonable proportion. 
Nevertheless, the situation did asked for radical changes and the implementation of new 
policies. The PP that would hold its seats until 2007, recognized the threats and like the other 
regions set up a general plan to recover from the recession. The PP advocated to maintain a 
governmental expenditure on 3% of its GRP, according to its central policies. 
Furthermore, it wanted to improve the international trade within the region, therefore the 
spending would focus more on improving the infrastructure to facilitate the international trade 
- e.g. new highways, better rail network, expansion of the local airport. Nevertheless, in the 
time period 1994 until 2008, Madrid would only invest a mere 19% of the total expenditure of 
Madrid in the infrastructure. The remaining 81% would be divided over healthcare (5%), 
education (6%) and other investments. A total of 70% of the expenditure was in other 
investments, which the Asamblea categorized in; (i) market structure, incentives for the market 
to adopt new technologies, and to expand their market to other regions and other nations. (ii) 
Public administration, improving the institutional structure of the region to better monitor 
financial, economic, and social matters. (iii) Research and Development, trying together with 
the market to research, develop and implement new technologies and theories to become the 
most innovative region. Whereas lastly; Environment, introducing incentives to stimulate the 
economic sectors to use more sustainable and cheaper resources. 
Graph 11. GRP per capita per region ’78-’08. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008), INE (1978-2008), and 
Carreras (2005) 
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Madrid was the region, compared with the other four, with the lowest investment in 
infrastructure. Furthermore, it was the only region to invest research and development, while 
together with Valencia, focussed more on international trade. Although, other regions also 
invested in international trade, it was more focused on the increase of international tourists, than 
exporting goods & services. On education, Madrid was with an average expenditure of 6% one 
of the regions that invested the least, whereas on healthcare it spent the average of all the regions 
combined.  
Nevertheless, Madrid widened the gap with the other regions regarding economic growth 
and GRP per capita, with the GRP per capita being 32% above the national average with at 
€30,816 in 2008. Lastly, in the period 1994 until 2008, it was also the region with the lowest 
unemployment rate, averaging 9.9%. Therefore, it could be assumed that Madrid was the region 
that was the furthest with its economic developments, and with the highest standard of living. 
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6.5 Overview of the Cases 
Following, there will be an overview which sums up all the dimension to determine economic 
development of all cases, in order to terminate the narrative process-tracing. The overviews will 
aid to answer the research question and hypotheses later on in the thesis 
Andalusia 
Cabinet Period Ideology 
Unemployment 
rate 
Expenditure 
of GRP 
% 
Expenditure 
on 
Education 
% 
Expenditure 
on 
Healthcare 
GRP per 
capita 
Dual-
Identity 
(% of 
pop.) 
PSOE 
1982-
1986 
Progressive 24.7% 3.5% 13% 7% €3,407.40 65% 
PSOE 
1986-
1990 
Progressive 27% 5% 9% 5% €5,278.05 66% 
PSOE 
1990-
1994 
Progressive 27.4% 4% 8% 4% €7,392.36 65% 
PSOE/ 
PA 
1994- 
1996 
Progressive/ 
Regionalism 
30.9% 4% 8% 2% €8,569.11 67% 
PSOE/ 
PA 
1996-
2000 
Progressive/ 
Regionalism 
25.7% 3.3% 8% 3% €10,219.63 67% 
PSOE 
2000-
2004 
Progressive 19.1% 4% 7% 5% €13,451.12 69% 
PSOE 
2004-
2008 
Progressive 14.8% 4% 8% 5% €17,220.82 67% 
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Castilla and León 
Cabinet Period Ideology 
Unemployment 
rate 
Expenditure 
of GRP 
% 
Expenditure 
on 
Education 
% 
Expenditure 
on 
Healthcare 
GRP per 
capita 
Dual-
Identity 
(% of 
pop.) 
PSOE 
1983-
1987 
Progressive 15.9% 3.7% 9% 6% €4,616.13 53% 
AP/PDP/ 
UL 
1987-
1991 
Conservative 15.4% 4.8% 8% 5% €6,871.97 51% 
PP 
1991-
1995 
Conservative 17.6% 4.7% 7% 4% €9,464.02 52% 
PP 
1995- 
1999 
Conservative 16.6% 4.5% 6% 4% €12,020.73 54% 
PP 
1999-
2003 
Conservative 11.4% 5.1% 4% 3% €14,997.43 55% 
PP 
2003-
2007 
Conservative 9.1% 5.4% 4% 5% €19,279.85 53% 
PP 
2007-
2008 
Conservative 8.3% 5.5% 4% 6% €21,954.71 51% 
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Valencia 
Cabinet Period Ideology 
Unemployment 
rate 
Expenditure 
of GRP 
% 
Expenditure 
on 
Education 
% 
Expenditure 
on 
Healthcare 
GRP per 
capita 
Dual-
Identity 
(% of 
pop.) 
PSPV 
1983-
1987 
Progressive 18.7% 2.9% 10% 8% €4,826.27 53% 
PSPV 
1987-
1991 
Progressive 16% 4.3% 10% 6% €7,369.49 53% 
PSPV 
1991-
1995 
Progressive 20% 4% 10% 4% €9,628.57 56% 
PP 
1995- 
1999 
Conservative 17.3% 3.8% 11% 4% €12,089.73 52% 
PP 
1999-
2003 
Conservative 11% 3.4% 5% 5% €15,616.91 52% 
PP 
2003-
2007 
Conservative 9.5% 3% 6% 7% €19,185.61 53% 
PP 
2007-
2008 
Conservative 10.3% 2.8% 8% 12% €21,319.52 56% 
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Castilla-La Mancha 
Cabinet Period Ideology 
Unemployment 
rate 
Expenditure 
of GRP 
% 
Expenditure 
on 
Education 
% 
Expenditure 
on 
Healthcare 
GRP per 
capita 
Dual-
Identity 
(% of 
pop.) 
PSOE 
1983-
1987 
Progressive 14.4% 4.1% 5% 7% €3,984.78 47% 
PSOE 
1987-
1991 
Progressive 12.6% 5.5% 6% 4% €6,566.96 51% 
PSOE 
1991-
1995 
Progressive 15.2% 5% 5% 3% €8,802.97 54% 
PSOE 
1995- 
1999 
Progressive 14.9% 3.8% 11% 4% €10,788.05 61% 
PSOE 
1999-
2003 
Progressive 10.2% 4.2% 10% 6% €13,191.13 61% 
PSOE 
2003-
2007 
Progressive 9% 4% 10% 8% €16,798.75 63% 
PSOE 
2007-
2008 
Progressive 9.6% 4.4% 9% 7% €19,032.28 65% 
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Madrid 
Cabinet Period Ideology 
Unemployment 
rate 
Expenditure 
of GRP 
% 
Expenditure 
on 
Education 
% 
Expenditure 
on 
Healthcare 
GRP per 
capita 
Dual-
Identity 
(% of 
pop.) 
PSOE 
1983-
1987 
Progressive 17.2% 2.1% 13% 5% €5,945 39% 
PSOE 
1987-
1991 
Progressive 12.3% 3.6% 11% 6% €9,245.71 40% 
PP 
1991-
1995 
Conservative 14% 3.1% 8% 4% €12,932.33 45% 
PP 
1995- 
1999 
Conservative 14.4% 2.7% 8% 5% €16,812.17 45% 
PP 
1999-
2003 
Conservative 8.4% 2.9% 5% 5% €22,164.95 44% 
PP 
2003-
2007 
Conservative 6.7% 3.2% 6% 6% €27,284.35 49% 
PP 
2007-
2008 
Conservative 7.4% 3.7% 5% 6% €30,730.13 45% 
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7. Analytical Discussion  
Initial conditions 
It is evident that identity did play an important role during the creation of the new 
constitution of Spain. It was the strong dual-identities in the majority of the Spanish regions, as 
well as in regions selected in this thesis except for Madrid, that advocated for the autonomous 
status for the communities. The transition into democracy did drastically changed the course of 
history due to the fact that the power structure of Spain became decentralized, making the 
communities responsible for their own economic development and growth. Furthermore, the 
decentralization resulted that some regions had to begin from scratch, since they did not have 
institutions to facilitate financial and social monitoring. Therefore, the new constitution 
changed the power structure of the State, but it did not resolve the economic disparities among 
regions. 
According to the data, it is the economic disadvantages and setbacks that had the greatest 
influences on the voting behaviour of the citizens, not their identity. Although, the theory 
indicated that dual-identities would lean more towards regional parties instead of national 
parties, the first central and regional elections revealed that, in the majority of regions, national 
parties became the victors. These political parties were burdened with the responsibility to lay 
the foundation of the regional parliaments, on whom the communities had to rely on for 
economic development of the region.  
Therefore, the initial conditions were vital to enable the communities to self-govern and to 
provide the regions with the power to control their social and economic situation. However, 
initial conditions alone are inadequate to indicate how the economic disparities amidst regions 
became so significantly large. 
 
Andalusia versus Castilla and León 
After the regions of Andalusia and Castilla and León received their autonomous status, the 
dyad already differed on economic aspects. Andalusia generated the double in GRP than 
Castilla and León, however the distribution per capita was in favour of Castilla and León. 
Nevertheless, both regions were struggling with a high unemployment rate and both 
experienced unsatisfied results with the UCD. Therefore, the duo elected the PSOE in their first 
regional election, indicating that among the inhabitants of the regions, economic circumstances 
are more important than identity.  
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The PSOE, in both cases, did not maintain the policies that were implemented by PSOE on 
a central level. Expenditure, in both regions, did not get to the desired 5%, and where Andalusia 
mainly invested in infrastructure, Castilla and León invested the half of its expenditure in the 
development of its institutional network. In its first term, the PSOE seemed to implement 
policies that they themselves found suitable to combat economic threats, while ignoring its own 
ideology. The data does not indicate that the identity of the region or the regional social status 
were taken into consideration when adopting new policies.   
A second change occurred after Castilla and León elected the People Coalition in their 
second regional elections, whereas Andalusia would continuously elect the PSOE. In 
Andalusia, the PSOE tried to maintain an expenditure of 5%, however the party continued to 
contradict its own central policies. The creation of the region’s economic plan for each term of 
the PSOE in Andalusia, resulted that policies would be adjusted to satisfy the economic 
situation and the party’s ideology. 
The implementation of the policies of the People Coalition, later on the PP, had a similar 
occurrence. Whereas, the PP discarded the idea that the government should invest in the region 
in order to maintain economic wealth; in Castilla and León, the expenditure repeatedly 
exceeded the 3% that the central policies prescribed. Nevertheless, the majority of the PP’s 
expenditure in Castilla and León, were on investments to stimulate the market and to provide 
incentives for corporations to follow the concept of the free market. The PP clearly 
differentiated itself from the main policy of the PSOE that was based on the idea that solely the 
government must provide economic and social welfare. 
Again, the data indicates that the policies of both political parties are more concerned on the 
economic consequences than aligning their policies to the parties’ ideologies. However, it 
becomes clear that the parties do not completely reject their ideology, yet they try to combine 
their ideology with the regional economic situation; albeit the latter is leading. 
Nonetheless, the regions did not showed any differences in growth of GRP per capita until 
the recession of 1993, where it seems that the policies of PP were more effective against 
economical setbacks than the policies of PSOE. The GRP per capita continued to grow in 
Castilla and León, while stagnating in Andalusia. 
In the end, the recession of 1993, provided Castilla and León with the opportunity to widen 
the gap with Andalusia, but after the recession, the two regions continued to have a similar 
growth rate. Still, combining the GRP per capita, the expenditure in education & healthcare, 
and the unemployment rate, the standard of living was better in Castilla and León. 
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Valencia versus Castilla-La Mancha 
As is the case with the previous comparison, Valencia and Castilla-La Mancha had different 
economic starting positions. The region of Valencia already had an old but inactive institutional 
network, whereas Castilla-La Mancha had to reform its network after the division of the ancient 
region of Castile.  
Both regions were divided between the dual-identity and the national identity, nevertheless 
the elected party after the first regional elections were socialist parties. In Valencia, however, 
the PSOE adopted the name of the PSPV to give the sentiment of being a regional party, while 
still following the ideology of the PSOE.  
Yet again, both political parties, although driven by the same beliefs and central structure, 
showed to have implemented different policies. The PSPV had an expenditure of a mere 2.9% 
of GRP in its first term, compared with the 4.1% of the PSOE in Castilla-La Mancha. 
Furthermore, 10% of the Valencian investments were made in education and 8% in healthcare, 
compared to Castilla-La Mancha’s 6% and 7%.  
In the second and third term of the PSPV and PSOE, it seemed that the parties fell back on 
their ideology by increasing their expenditure to respectively 4% and 5%. Still, the regions 
divided the investments again in different factors. Nevertheless, the economic growth between 
Valencia and Castilla-La Mancha was equal and did not widen or close the economic gap 
between the regions. The initial economic position of the regions is the reason why the 
communities differed until this point. 
The biggest change occurred after the recession when the two regions came close to each 
other regarding the economic wealth and the distribution of GRP per capita. This led to the 
assignation of the PP in the region of Valencia in 1995. According to the data, especially in the 
growth of GRP per capita, Valencia started to widen the gap with Castilla-La Mancha, whereas 
it slowly started to fight back unemployment. Furthermore, the implemented policies of the PP 
in Valencia were aligned with their central policies and their ideology. The PP made sure the 
government got less involved with the economy, whereas the expenditures were limited around 
3%. Moreover, the party relocated more resources in form of incentives or subsidies to promote 
the free-market concept, and initiate more international trade.  
The PSOE in Castilla-La Mancha also diverted from its initial path and decrease in 
expenditure, but relocated more investments into education and healthcare. Furthermore, the 
PSOE increased its investments in infrastructure to create more jobs opportunities in the region. 
This did have a direct effect on the unemployment rate but, compared with Valencia, it did 
generated less economic growth.  
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Madrid 
The first regional election of Madrid was won by the PSOE. However, the data indicates that 
the choice for the PSOE was more out of dissatisfaction with UCD than because of the ideology 
of the party. Madrid experienced economic growth in the first term of the PSOE, but did not 
encountered events where economic peaks occurred. Also, the PSOE did not follow its central 
policies in Madrid neither, by just spending 2.1% of its GRP in its first term and 3.6% in its 
second term. However, due to the economic wealth of the region, more investments were made 
in social attributes rather than economical; only 19% in infrastructure, and 81% in education, 
healthcare and other investments.  
When the PP was elected in 1991, the economy of the region started to grow more rapidly. 
Furthermore, Madrid did not feel much of the recession of 1993, and it recovered faster than 
the other regions. It is this moment in time that Madrid widened the gap compared to the other 
regions. The data indicates that the policies of the PP were effective to deflect most 
repercussions of the recession. The expenditure of Madrid was mainly focused on stimulating 
the regional market and to divert its scope to the international market. All investments on 
infrastructure were to accommodate economic growth, whereas lastly it maintained a steady 
percentage of its expenditure in education and in healthcare. This resulted that Madrid is the 
most economic developed community of the five cases of the dissertation. 
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8. Conclusion 
National parties that are elected in the general elections of Spain, and are simultaneously 
active on a regional level, ought to share similar policies and ideas. However, the findings of 
this dissertation indicate otherwise; the data that emerged from the research showed clear signs 
that regional parliaments are more concerned about the welfare of their own regions rather than 
strictly follow the central policies from a national level. This might be stating the obvious since 
the communities have an autonomous status, yet it is interesting to see that political parties 
changed their preferences when they became active on a regional level. 
However, it is a superfluous statement to indicate that the political parties have gone 
complete rogue. Political parties maintain a midway between the ideology of the party and the 
situation within the region. Hence, the most effective and efficient policies are constituted in 
order to provide economic and social benefits for the region, as long as the policies do not divert 
too much from the party’s ideology.  
Therefore, the two specific hypotheses of the thesis can be considered partial proven, since 
ideology and regional welfare are both taken into account when formulating policies. Looking 
at the policies that were implemented in the cases, it is safe to state that parties maintained an 
economic perspective when deciding on policies to improve the economic situation of the 
region, thus proving the first general hypothesis.  
Proving the first general hypothesis does not incline that the second general hypothesis is 
automatically disproven. However, it is arduous to identify a clear link in the findings between 
the regional identity and the ideology of the party. Albeit, the data points out that political 
parties, which are active on a regional level, put the regional situation higher on the political 
agenda than the national condition. On the other hand, the research reveals that, in some cases, 
the PSOE respected the identity of its regions, yet did not promote regionalism. Therefore, the 
party implemented policies to fight the increasing regionalism and to promote the dual-identity.  
However, in the ideology of the PP, not a lot is mentioned regarding the identity of the 
regions, but more details are found about the development of the economic and social situation 
of the regions; thus arguing that an economic perspective is more eminent.  
Despite that identity is important among the majority of the Spaniards, this thesis argues that 
identity was not relevant enough for the political parties, whom are active nationwide, to adjust 
their ideology accordingly. Therefore, it becomes more evident that the second general 
hypothesis can be considered disproven. 
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Through detailed narrative process-tracing, this thesis has provided a well-detailed and fine 
description of the political history of the communities; Andalusia, Valencia, Madrid, Castilla 
and León, and Castilla-La Mancha, and the policies that were implemented. Thanks to the 
gathered data, it was possible to conduct cross-case comparisons in order to reveal how the 
economic development of the communities differentiated. 
This dissertation, therefore, contributes to the academic literatures by providing extra 
knowledge on how the treated regions evolved economically within a decentralized power 
structure, expressing in detail the policy-making process of national and regional parties, while 
considering the role of the dual-identity.  
Furthermore, it is noticeable that specific events occurred that made the communities 
vulnerable for economic changes. Although, the election of the first regional parliaments and 
the Spanish accession into the European Union were events that did influence the economic 
development of the autonomous communities, but they contributed marginally to the economic 
differentiation. 
The period around the recession of 1993 was the event that had the most influence on the 
economic differentiation between regions. To be more precise, the findings indicated that the 
communities which elected the PP before or immediately after the recession, experienced more 
economic growth. The policies of the PP enabled the regions to generate more economic 
growth, resulting in larger investments in education and in healthcare. Moreover, the 
communities where the PP was active, experienced a faster drop in their unemployment rate 
after the recession, compared to the communities under the hegemony of the PSOE. The 
policies of the PP were concentrated on economic welfare and customized on the regional 
situation, while excluding the region’s identity. 
Therefore, it can be argued that political parties whom approached regions more from an 
economic perspective rather than a social approach, instituted policies that provided more 
economic protection, insuring more economic growth.   
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10. Appendices 
Appendix A. Sectorial Distribution of Employment 1978-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A1. Sectorial Distribution of Andalusia 1978-2008. Calculation based on Carreras (2005). 
Appendix A2. Sectorial Distribution of Valencia 1978-2008. Calculation based on Carreras (2005). 
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Appendix A3. Sectorial Distribution of Madrid 1978-2008. Calculation based on Carreras (2005). 
Appendix A4. Sectorial Distribution of Castilla & León 1978-2008. Calculation based on Carreras (2005). 
Mi Comunidad es su Comunidad   115 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A5. Sectorial Distribution of Castilla-La Mancha 1978-2008. Calculation based on Carreras (2005). 
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Appendix B. Economic Data Regions 1994-2008 
 
Appendix B1. Economic Data Andalusia 1994-2008. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008) 
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Appendix B2. Economic Data Valencia 1994-2008. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008) 
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Appendix B3. Economic Data Madrid 1994-2008. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008) 
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Appendix B4. Economic Data Castilla & León 1994-2008. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008) 
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Appendix B5. Economic Data Castilla-La Mancha 1994-2008. Calculation based on BDMORES (2008) 
 
 
